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Protecting associational freedom is a core, independent yet unappreciated part of the Fourth
Amendment.  New surveillance techniques threaten that freedom.  Surveillance is no longer pri-
marily forward looking.  Today, changing technology allows law enforcement and intelligence
services to obtain the same, if not more, information about all of us by looking backward.  This
shift massively expands the government’s ability to examine, investigate, and deter exercise of the
freedom of association.
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Forward-looking surveillance has limits that don’t apply to backward-looking surveillance.
Some limits are practical such as the cost to place a person in a car to follow a suspect.  Some are
procedural, such as the requirement that surveillance relate to criminal activity.  In addition,
surveillance such as wiretapping and using a GPS tracker often requires a warrant, involving
review by a neutral magistrate.  The warrant sets limits on what information may be collected,
how it is collected, and how it can be used.  The surveillance is also time limited and requires
continual justification to a judge, or the surveillance will be shut down.  With backward-looking
surveillance all of these protections are gone.  Anyone conducting surveillance can now use low-
cost technology to track us or need only ask a business for the record of where we went, whom we
called, what we read, and more.  Revelation of the NSA’s vast PRISM surveillance project is but
the most recent example of overreaching surveillance.  The FBI has previously deployed programs
to read mail, obtain lists of books read, demand member lists, and generate watch lists of people to
round up in case of national emergency.  The efforts vary; the harm is the same.  With access to a
myriad of our records, law enforcement or intelligence services have an almost perfect picture of
our activities and associations regardless of whether they are criminal.  With digital records these
harms are more acute.  Once the data about our activities is gathered, that data may be kept
indefinitely.  There is now a data hoard.  Once created, the hoard can be continually rifled to
investigate us but without any effective oversight.  In short, data hoards present new ways to
harm associational freedom.
Yet, in the face of these new surveillance threats, our current understanding of associational
freedom is thin.  We over-focus on speech and miss the importance of the precursors to speech—the
ability to meet or network and to share, explore, accept, and reject ideas and then choose whether
to speak.  Recent work has shown, however, that the Constitution protects associational activities,
because they enable self-governance and foster the potential for speech.  That work has looked to
the First Amendment.  I show that these concerns also appear in Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence and work to protect us from surveillance regardless of whether an act is speech or is shared
with others including third parties.
The Article then examines the implications of the growing technology of backward-looking
surveillance for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Notably, warrant procedures should be
updated, building especially on the idea of return, which requires the government to return items
taken as part of an investigation once they are not needed.  In our new era of backward-looking
surveillance, the idea of return requires deletion of data after an investigation.  This shift will
allow access to data but limit the ability to overreach and threaten associational freedom.  When
new surveillance techniques threaten associational freedom, they must be subject to proper consti-
tutional limits.  This Article explains why those limits are needed, when they must be in place,
and how they operate.
INTRODUCTION
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expres-
sive freedoms.  And the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal
private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.
—Justice Sonia Sotomayor, United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
[I]n any normal sense of the word [privacy] . . . there would be an uneasiness,
and I think a justified uneasiness, if those who patronized [a] bar felt that their names
were being taken down and filed for future reference [by the government]. . . . [M]ost of
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us would feel that . . . a dossier on every citizen ought not to be compiled even if
manpower were available to do it . . . .
—William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy
Consistent with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?
Or: Privacy, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby,
23 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1974).1
The Constitution demands that we limit law enforcement and domestic
intelligence precisely when it has become too easy to conduct surveillance,
because that power threatens core aspects of our democracy.2  To date, we
have treated forward-looking surveillance and backward-looking surveillance
differently.  Changes in technology call this distinction into question and in
some cases makes it untenable.  Surveillance can reveal our activities and
associations, but forward-looking surveillance has limits.  Surveillance such as
wiretapping and using a GPS tracker often requires a warrant and must relate
to criminal activity.  Judges review surveillance procedures before they are
deployed.  The warrant will be specific about what information may be col-
lected, how it is collected, and how it can be used.  The surveillance is also
time limited and requires continual justification to a judge, or the surveil-
1 The former Chief Justice was a Justice when he wrote this article.
2 Accord Swire, Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1310–15 (2004) [hereinafter Swire, System of Foreign Intelligence]
(detailing the history and logic behind limits on law enforcement and domestic security
use of surveillance).  Although foreign intelligence operates under different and arguably
more lenient rules than law enforcement and domestic security, the concern for safeguard-
ing rights and democratic process can be seen in that realm too. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
CLARKE ET AL., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOL-
OGIES 154 (2013) (“The special protections [under FISA] for United States persons must
therefore be understood as a crucial safeguard of democratic accountability and effective
self-governance within the American political system.  In light of that history and those
concerns, there is good reason for every nation to enact special restrictions on government
surveillance of those persons who participate directly in its own system of self-govern-
ance.”).  Orin Kerr has argued that the Supreme Court seeks equilibrium between law
enforcement and criminals.  Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 480–81 (2011).  This Article agrees that the Court seeks
balance but argues there are different equilibriums the Court seeks, that protecting associ-
ational freedom is part of that analysis, and that striking a balance between citizens’ rights
and surveillance is part of the balancing as well. See infra notes 170–82; see also Paul Ohm,
The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 1341–45 (2012) (ques-
tioning Kerr’s approach to equilibrium as a “balance sheet approach” that “does little more
than justify the rules we have today”).  This Article agrees with Swire’s argument “that the
reasonableness doctrine offers the best opportunity to [address] unconstrained discretion
in high-tech searches” and that “‘minimization’ of intrusive surveillance and procedural
checks against standardless or discriminatory surveillance” are the levers to fashion a solu-
tion.  Peter Swire, A Reasonableness Approach to Searches After the Jones GPS Tracking Case, 64
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 57, 58 (2012) [hereinafter Swire, A Reasonableness Approach].  I aug-
ment this point by showing how association animates the nature of the reasonableness
inquiry.
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lance will be shut down.  With backward-looking surveillance all these protec-
tions are gone.  Law enforcement or intelligence services3 need only ask a
business for the record of where we went, whom we called, what we read, and
more.4  They then have a near perfect picture of our activities and associa-
3 This Article focuses on law enforcement and domestic security, which are different
from foreign intelligence. See, e.g., Swire, System of Foreign Intelligence, supra note 2, at
1341–42.  In simplest terms, law enforcement and domestic security operate under differ-
ent and more restrictive rules than foreign intelligence. Id. at 1341 (“The 1967 Katz and
Berger decisions overruled Olmstead and emphasized the strong constitutional limits on how
electronic surveillance could be used for law enforcement purposes.  The constitutional
mandates for law enforcement wiretaps notably included notice to the target once a wire-
tap was concluded and the ability of defendants to confront the wiretap and other evi-
dence against them.” (footnote omitted)).  The 1972 Keith case held that the Fourth
Amendment requires a prior warrant for electronic surveillance in domestic security mat-
ters. See United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 319–21 (1972); accord
Swire, System of Foreign Intelligence, supra note 2, at 1312–15 (explaining the “The Law and
Logic of National Security Wiretaps”).  The Court has nonetheless made a distinction
between law enforcement pursuing “ordinary crime” and domestic security, because
domestic security can involve a different set of circumstances. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 322; see
also Swire, System of Foreign Intelligence, supra note 2, at 1315 (noting that the Court’s con-
cerns regarding limits on domestic security were similar to concerns raised about manag-
ing security after the September 11 attacks on the United States).  Foreign intelligence is a
separate realm focused on surveillance of “foreign powers.” See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1)
(2012).  Foreign power is a broad term in this context. See Swire, System of Foreign Intelli-
gence, supra note 2, at 1320–21 (explaining that the definition includes “any ‘foreign gov-
ernment or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the United States,’ . . . a
‘faction of a foreign nation,’ or a ‘foreign-based political organization, not substantially
composed of United States persons,’ [and] [e]ven in 1978, the definition also included ‘a
group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor’” (quoting
50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (2000))).  A key concern in drawing the line between foreign intelli-
gence and domestic security is to protect U.S. persons—U.S. citizens and permanent
residents—from surveillance. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i).  Thus revelations about the NSA’s
surveillance programs cause greatest concern when they touch on domestic security and
surveillance of U.S. persons.  That said, the techniques the NSA has used to gather and
analyze data can be used by law enforcement and domestic security, and in that sense, this
Article seeks to address the implications of those techniques for those arenas.
4 Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act changed FISA to allow for orders compelling third
parties to produce business records and other tangible objects. See Uniting and Strength-
ening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terror-
ism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1)).  To obtain such records the government
must give “a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the tangible things sought are relevant” to an authorized investigation intended to protect
“against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”  USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 106, 120 Stat. 192,
196 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)).  For an explanation of the
expansion of government powers under FISA to include the use of trap and trace and the
pen register as well as the changing views on compelling third party records, see CLARKE ET
AL., supra note 2, at 79–86.
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tions regardless of whether they are criminal.5  There is thus an asymmetry
that makes little sense.
Consider tracking.  The FBI has stated a preference for using a warrant
when using a GPS tracker.6  If the FBI wishes to track someone for the next
twenty days with a GPS tracker, it will go through warrant procedures and
adhere to them.7  If there is a misstep in obeying the warrant, the evidence
gathered can be thrown out.8  Yet, why go through the process of obtaining a
warrant, placing a device on a car, retrieving the device, and adhering to all
the steps a warrant requires?  The FBI can instead identify a suspect, wait
twenty days, and find the same information for those twenty days with almost
no process.9  It can even ask for records for more than the twenty days it
wanted to start; and arguably as far back as third party records are kept.
Worse, once the data is gathered, the gatherer may keep that data indefi-
nitely.  They have a data hoard.  That hoard grows with each new data
request.
Once created, the hoard can be continually rifled to investigate us but
without any effective oversight.10  But desire does not make the practice cor-
5 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65–66 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring); accord
Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 114
(2007) (“In the Information Age, a massive amount of data about our lives—data that may
pertain to First Amendment activities—is maintained by third-party businesses and
organizations.”).
6 See infra notes 165–66.  There is a debate about when tracking requires a warrant.
And there is an open question whether other modes of tracking such as use of cell tower
geolocation data that provide the same or similar information as GPS trackers requires a
warrant. Id.  This Article addresses the question as one of associational freedom.  The
Article offers that this approach is not technology specific and so overcomes some of the
technology specific issues that arise in surveillance law.
7 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(C).
8 That is what happened in Jones. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
9 See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 165–75 (2004) (comparing subpoena procedures to obtain records
from third parties and warrant procedures).
10 Oversight of surveillance matters for both forward- and backward-looking surveil-
lance.  As Peter Swire has argued, two cases, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), and
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945, show that the Court is concerned with the lack of oversight. See
Swire, A Reasonableness Approach, supra note 2, at 58 (“The unanswered questions from the
Jones argument thus suggest that the Court is seeking a new, as-yet unarticulated way to
constrain police and government discretion to conduct unprecedented surveillance.  The
proposal here is that the answer lies in addressing what the Supreme Court in Delaware v.
Prouse called ‘standardless and unconstrained discretion,’ and what Justice Sotomayor
called ‘unfettered discretion’ in her concurrence in Jones.” (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at
661; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).  The problem of being able to
evade oversight procedures appears in the foreign intelligence arena as well. See CLARKE ET
AL., supra note 2, at 105, 118 (noting “several significant compliance issues” regarding the
NSA’s bulk collection of telephony metadata and recommending that such data not be
stored by the government as a way to “reduce the risk, both actual and perceived, of gov-
ernment abuse”).
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rect.  When a calamity occurs, the outcry about what the government could
or should have done to prevent the event is fierce.11  As President Obama has
said, “if another 9/11 or massive cyber attack occurs, [executive actors] will
be asked by Congress and the media why they failed to connect the dots.”12
Other crimes—child abductions, serial killing, shooting sprees—spur the
same response.13  It is the executive’s job to police and protect us.  It is soci-
ety’s job to set out the limits on that duty.  Having access to data may make
law enforcement and intelligence services more efficient.  But efficiency and
ease are not the touchstones of the Constitution’s approach to surveillance.14
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the reasonable expectation of
privacy test are supposed to calibrate the limits on law enforcement and
domestic intelligence surveillance, but the analysis gets lost in asking whether
something is private or public.  Because of the obsession with privacy as
secrecy, the inquiry does not protect public acts, even limited ones such as
acts that have been disclosed to third parties.15  Yet many acts are important
even if they have not been kept secret.  Freedom from surveillance is impor-
tant, because surveillance undermines associational freedom.
I argue that protecting associational freedom is a core, independent, yet
underappreciated part of the Fourth Amendment.  If we recapture that func-
tion, we will see how to limit all manners of surveillance.  Until we do that,
government will be able to achieve a type of total surveillance that threatens
associational freedom.16
11 This problem can be understood as the tradeoff between short-term and long-term
privacy protection. See, e.g., Swire, System of Foreign Intelligence, supra note 2, at 1350 (“In the
short term, when asked whether they would support a specific measure to fight terrorism,
many people would support the measure.  Support for new security measures would be
especially high in the midst of a crisis.  On the other hand, especially as the crisis eases,
many people would then support overall measures that reduce the risk of a ‘Big Brother’
society.”).
12 Barack Obama, Transcript of President Obama’s Jan. 17 Speech on NSA Reforms, WASH.
POST (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-
obamas-jan-17-speech-on-nsa-reforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a-7f8c-11e3-9556-
4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html [hereinafter Transcript of NSA Reform Speech].
13 Cf. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1, 16 (2008) (“Once governments have access to powerful surveillance and data mining
technologies, there will be enormous political pressure to use them in everyday law
enforcement and for delivery of government services.”).
14 Cf. Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amend-
ment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 83 (1995) (“Pleas for governmental efficiency may too easily
override concern for individual rights [as protected by the Privacy Act].”); Ohm, supra
note 2, at 1341–47 (arguing that “excessive government power will justify creating artificial
police inefficiency”).
15 See generally SOLOVE, supra note 9, at 165–75 (comparing subpoena procedure to
obtain records from third parties and warrant procedures).
16 Justice Sotomayor has expressed this concern.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I would also consider the appropriateness of
entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a
tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb
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Associational freedom protects acts that support and foster speech, but
that protection exists regardless of whether speech occurs.  Associational
freedom is about the acts—such as the right to petition, to assemble, to read,
to coordinate activity, to use social networks, to march, and more—that are
not speech and are often not private, but provide the foundation for public
speech, dissent, and democracy.17  Associational freedom is thus about some-
thing other than expressive speech18 and something other than privacy as
secrecy from everyone.  In current terms, associational freedom is about the
power of networking.19  Diverse, challenging, and dissenting speech is core
to our democracy.20  But to have the possibility of that speech, we need to
share and develop ideas free from government surveillance so we can choose
whether to speak, and if we do speak, what to say.21  Without associational
freedom, our power for self-governance erodes.22  Preventing the state from
hidden, pervasive watching, recording, and tracking where we go enables
associational freedom, because we need to be able to meet, share ideas, and
choose whether to assemble, petition, vote, or take other action in public.
Although those acts may not be fully private in that two or many more people
may be involved, they still need to be private from government oversight.
Since the Founding, the executive branch, in multiple periods, has used
aggressive methods to suppress speech and associations it does not like.23  In
some cases the attacks were on what was said or the ability to meet; in others
arbitrary exercises of police power to and prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’”
(quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948))).
17 Several scholars have done work on what might be called the First Amendment
privacy project. See infra Section I.B.  For example, Neil Richards has called many of these
interests intellectual privacy.  Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 387
(2008).  I agree with his claims and most of his ideas, but I diverge from Richards, who
relies on the First Amendment and speech, especially as he sets aside association and dis-
tances it from his idea of freedom of thought in his analysis. See id. at 426.  I argue that the
Court has protected these “free thinking” interests as part of association, for reasons inde-
pendent of speech or privacy.  In that sense I hope to augment the First Amendment pri-
vacy project and provide further grounding protection for associational freedom from
within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
18 See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978 (2011) (dem-
onstrating that associational rights historically were independent of free speech and press
rights).
19 See Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data Protection vs.
Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (2012) (arguing there is a “profound connec-
tion between social networking and freedom of association” and exploring the tension
between the need to share information to build networks and associate and the potential
privacy harms when the state interferes with that sharing).
20 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting that there is “a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials”).
21 Cf. Richards, supra note 17, at 391 (“If we are interested in a free and robust public
debate we must safeguard its wellspring of private intellectual activity.”).
22 See Bhagwat, supra note 18, at 989.
23 See infra Section I.A.
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widespread surveillance was used to shut down dissent.24  Regardless of the
mode, the transgressions occurred as part of trying to preserve law and order
or protect national security in the face of real threats, but the Court has still
held those acts unconstitutional.25
Today we have new a problem.  Two distinct but related types of surveil-
lance raise associational concerns.  One type of surveillance looks forward.  It
allows the government to track everywhere we go.  The other looks backward
and seems less harmful.  But that backward-looking surveillance allows the
government to threaten associational freedom as much, if not more than the
real time spying with which we are familiar.
Unlike the past, we live in an explosion of data-generating devices and
activities, and they tell much about what we do, our health, and our politics.
According to the Pew Center, as of January 2014, 90% of Americans own cell
phones and 58% of those are smart phones.26  In addition, 42% of Ameri-
cans use a tablet and 32% an e-reader.27  People use these devices to check
email, text, surf the web, post to social networks, and get directions, with 64%
engaging in online use on their phones and 34% using phones for their
main online activity.28  Many users find these devices indispensible, with
almost 30% saying they can’t “imagine living without” their cell phone.29
More than 100 billion apps were downloaded in 2013 and some project that
number to reach more than 250 billion by 2017.30  Teens send about sixty
texts a day, and adults about half that depending on age.31  One might think
24 The 1976 Church Committee Report, which investigated intelligence practices of
the government, recognized that surveillance by means of bugs, wiretaps, and more, cap-
tured “vast amounts of information about the personal lives, views, and associations of
American citizens.” S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. 2, at 5 (1976); see Danielle Keats Citron &
Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
1441, 1445 (2011) (stating that intergovernmental gathering and sharing of intelligence
has been used to monitor and disparage political dissent); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of
Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1937–38 (2013) (detailing international, domestic,
dictatorial, and democratic regimes using similar tactics in recent years); Swire, System of
Foreign Intelligence, supra note 2, at 1315 (noting the Supreme Court’s recognition of the
potential for abuse in domestic security wiretaps, such as the temptation to oversee politi-
cal dissent).
25 See infra Sections I.A–B.





30 See Ingrid Lunden, Gartner: 102B App Store Downloads Globally in 2013, $26B in Sales,
17% from In-App Purchases, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 19, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/
09/19/gartner-102b-app-store-downloads-globally-in-2013-26b-in-sales-17-from-in-app-
purchases.
31 See Alex Cocotas, Chart of the Day: Kids Send a Mind Boggling Number of Texts Every
Month, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-
day-number-of-texts-sent-2013-3.  Monthly, 18–24 year olds send/receive around 3800 texts
monthly; 25–34 year olds about 2200; 35–44 year olds about 1500; 45–54 year olds about
1000; and those over 55 about 500. Id.
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much of the activity is frivolous, yet mobile computing is used for politics.
The number of Americans who use cell phones to track political issues went
from 13% in 2010 to 28% in 2014.32  And 16% of Americans used social
media to follow political figures and issues in 2014; that is up from 6% in
2010.33  All these activities generate and log data in detail and volume like
never before.  Because of them, the government can easily gather data and
learn about where someone has been or with whom someone spoke.
These technologies play a “vital role” in “private communication,”34 and
the laws of ten, fifteen, or thirty-five years ago could not contemplate these
changes in behaviors and their implications.35  As an example, consider
metadata.  Metadata is usually defined as time, date, from whom, and to
whom a message is sent but can also include a URL for a website.36  The
analogy is to address or routing information on an envelope.37  That view
seems to indicate that metadata reveals little.  Yet, metadata can be used to
figure out someone’s political interests, social network, interest in semiauto-
matic weapons, whether he called a suicide hotline, health conditions, and
more.38  To date, the fights over access to metadata turn on whether it is
content or non-content and whether it is public or private.  But metadata and
other data that reveals our associational activity is not speech nor is it pri-
vate.39  Trying to force protection for that data into those rubrics fails to offer
a coherent, constitutionally grounded explanation and solution as to why,
32 See Aaron Smith, Cell Phones, Social Media, and Campaign 2014, PEW RESEARCH
INTERNET PROJECT (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/03/cell-phones-
social-media-and-campaign-2014/.
33 Id.
34 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
35 Accord Julian Hattem, NSA Phone Program Faces Key Test, THE HILL (Nov. 2, 2014)
(the “explosion of data” changes the facts from what they were in 1979 under Smith v.
Maryland and changes the legal outcomes); see also Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435
(1976) (holding phone data exposed to third part phone company had no reasonable
expectation of privacy).
36 See STEVEN M. BELLOVIN, SUBMISSION TO THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT
BOARD: TECHNICAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE § 215 AND § 702 SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS 5–7 (July
31, 2013), available at https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/PCLOB-statement.pdf.
37 Id.
38 Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler, MetaPhone: The Sensitivity of Telephone Metadata
(Mar. 12, 2014), http://webpolicy.org/2014/03/12/metaphone-the-sensitivity-of-tele
phone-metadata/.
39 Swire, supra note 19, at 1404 (“U.S. courts have found no general constitutional
right, however, for individuals in the realm of data privacy.”); accord Brief Amici Curiae of
the Elec. Frontier Found. et al. in Support of Appellees at 5, Klayman v. Obama, Nos. 14-
5004, 14-5005, 14-5016, 14-5017 (consolidated) (D.C. Cir. Aug. 20, 2014) (arguing that the
content/noncontent distinction is misleading and regardless of what one calls it, metadata
“reveals highly personal information about the person and her life”); Dimitri Tokmetzis,
How Your Innocent Smart Phone Passes on Almost Your Entire Life to the Secret Service, BITS OF
FREEDOM (July 30, 2014, 4:46 PM), https://www.bof.nl/2014/07/30/how-your-innocent-
smartphone-passes-on-almost-your-entire-life-to-the-secret-service/ (examining one week’s
metadata for one user and finding information about the subject’s occupation, his girl-
friend, sports interests, news reading habits, television and YouTube viewing habits, use of
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when, and how data-gathering and use practices must be limited.  I argue
that associational freedom provides that ground and answers those questions.
One way to think of the change is the evolution of dossiers.  Concern
over the way government can keep dossiers on people and then misuse them
is old.  Popular culture nodded to that fear in the 1942 movie Casablanca.
Major Strasser, a Nazi, tells Richard Blaine: “We have a complete dossier on
you: Richard Blaine, American, age thirty-seven.  Cannot return to his coun-
try.  The reason is a little vague.  We also know what you did in Paris, Mr.
Blaine, and also we know why you left Paris.”  He hands the dossier to Blaine
and says, “Don’t worry, we are not going to broadcast it.”  To which Blaine
quips as he reads the file, “Are my eyes really brown?”40  Not all of us can be
so glib.
The potential for dossier misuse is large.  Dossier power has been a sub-
ject of scholarship and concern from the 1960s to the present.41  Even with
older analog dossiers, it is too easy to harvest, hoard, and analyze data and
then step far beyond legitimate goals into acts that threaten civil liberties.42
As no less than then-Justice Rehnquist said in the early 1970s, “most of us
would feel that . . . a dossier on every citizen ought not to be compiled even if
manpower were available to do it.”43  Digitization increased the problems.  It
still took time to generate dossiers, but instead of having to root through file
cabinets, cross-reference, and connect dots, digitization allowed dossiers to
be searched and easily shared.  Data is the next big step in dossier production
and analysis.  In Rehnquist’s terms, manpower and costs are no longer barri-
ers to modern dossier building.
three email accounts to manage commercial, personal, and work correspondence, his dif-
ferent social networks, and more).
40 CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942).
41 See, e.g., KENNETH C. LAUDON, DOSSIER SOCIETY (Rob Kling & Kenneth L. Kraemer
eds., 1986) (analyzing the use of computerized criminal history systems); HERBERT MIT-
GANG, DANGEROUS DOSSIERS (1988) (documenting the government’s maintenance of dos-
siers on writers and thinkers such as Ernest Hemingway, Dorothy Paker, Dashiell Hammett,
Thornton Wilder, Edmund Wilson, Graham Greene, and methods of infiltrating groups to
assemble the dossiers); ON RECORD: FILES AND DOSSIERS IN AMERICAN LIFE (Stanton
Wheeler ed., 1969) (examining the way educational, economic, governmental, and welfare
institutions generated dossiers and the law about access to those dossiers); SOLOVE, supra
note 9, at 1–26 (investigating the problems of digital dossiers).
42 See, e.g., CLARKE ET AL., supra note 2, at 154; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 24, at
1458–63 (detailing ways that data gathering and analysis programs for domestic intelli-
gence programs have enabled “surveillance of political, racial, ethnic, and religious
groups” and inclusion of a journalist and blogger on a threat list based on his writings); cf.
Randy Barnett, Knowledge Is Power: How the NSA Bulk Data Seizure Program Is Like Gun Regis-
tration, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspira
cy/wp/2014/01/21/knowledge-is-power-how-the-nsa-bulk-data-seizure-program-is-like-gun-
registration/ (arguing that even if bulk data collection were legal it provides too much
power in one place).
43 William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective
Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 10 (1974).
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Dossiers of where we go and with whom we meet are created automati-
cally as we go through our daily lives.  They reside with cell phone, Internet,
search, email, e-commerce, credit, and almost any service we use.  The tre-
mendous power of the state to compel production of this information com-
bined with what the state can do with technology and data creates a moral
hazard.  As Justice Sotomayor put it, “the Government’s unrestrained power
to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to
abuse.”44  Once the government has obtained data, it is easy and inexpensive
to store and search.  Thus, the data is not deleted or destroyed; it is
hoarded.45  That vat of temptation never goes away.46  The lack of rules on
the government’s use of the data explains why it has an incentive to gather
data, keep it, and increase its stores.  After the government has its data hoard,
the barriers to dragnet and general searches—ordinarily unconstitutional—
are gone.  If someone wishes to dive into the data and see whether embar-
rassing, or even blackmail-worthy, data is available, they can do so.47  These
temptations are precisely why we must rethink how we protect associational
freedom in the age of data hoarding.  By understanding what associational
freedom is, what threatens it, and how we have protected it in the past, we
will find that there is a way to protect it now and in the future.
Part I of this Article establishes the role and history of associational free-
dom.  Most analysis of the First Amendment and privacy draws on the speech
and expressive aspects of the First Amendment.  That move misses the way in
44 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
45 Although the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012), is supposed to address the
problems of government data storage and use, the limits on the Act’s reach and the carve
outs for law enforcement blunt its power for the issues this Article addresses. See Krent,
supra note 14, at 83 (“[T]he Privacy Act places no restrictions whatsoever on criminal law
enforcement use, regardless of how the government obtained the information.  And the
definition of routine use has evidently expanded exponentially.”).  The PRISM program
appears to have some limits on storage, but these are still long (five to ten years) and seem
to be self-imposed. See James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Gathers Data on Social Connec-
tions of U.S. Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/
nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?pagewanted=all (“[A]n internal briefing
paper from the N.S.A. Office of Legal Counsel showed that the agency was allowed to
collect and retain raw traffic, which includes both metadata and content, about ‘U.S. per-
sons’ for up to five years online and for an additional 10 years offline for ‘historical
searches.’”).
46 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 24, at 1463–64 (noting the potential for
“[m]ission [c]reep” as data gathered for one purpose such as anti-terror actions can be
used to address almost “all threats” but without the oversight and grounding that was in
place when a project began).
47 The history of United States abuse of surveillance includes use of information
against political opponents, attempts to undermine disfavored groups and movements,
and use of the fear that all mail is being opened. See MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., THE
LAWLESS STATE: THE CRIMES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES (1976); Swire, System of
Foreign Intelligence, supra note 2, at 1317–19.  For the extreme possible outcome of surveil-
lance as practiced outside the United States, see Richards, supra note 24, at 1953–54
(detailing instances of blackmail and rules against using communist secret police files
because of the threat of blackmail).
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which the First Amendment protects non-speech activity.  I draw on recent
First Amendment scholarship to show that associational freedom has its own
logic.  It is an independent interest that reaches many activities and things—
such as the data we generate as we engage in associational activities—that do
not qualify as expressive speech and that we nonetheless protect.  Just as First
Amendment analysis can be myopic and look only to speech, Fourth Amend-
ment analysis can miss interests other than privacy as secrecy.  I examine
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and show that it too protects associational
freedom as an independent interest.  For example, in both Berger v. New
York48 and United States v. Jones,49 associational freedom was an underlying
rationale for questioning and limiting surveillance.  Drawing on these two
strains of thought, I show that the Constitution demands strong, but not
absolute, limits on the government’s ability to interfere with associational
freedom.
Part II explains the way we balance law enforcement’s need for surveil-
lance and society’s need for associational freedom.  I show how associational
freedom informs and shapes warrant procedures for forward-looking surveil-
lance, especially when technology allows the government to watch and track
us easily and at low cost.  I then argue that the potential harms of forward-
looking surveillance reappear in backward-looking surveillance.  Because our
lives now create precise records with extreme detail of what we do, those
records enable backward-looking surveillance.  They also create a large temp-
tation to engage in overreaching surveillance.  Much of the data that raises
concerns, however, is not covered by warrants and is easily accessible.  This
Part concludes by explaining how historical and recent government surveil-
lance chills associational freedom and by showing how data aggravates that
problem.
Data hoards are not going away, but that does not mean there should be
unfettered access to them.  Part III applies associational freedom as I have
developed it to surveillance and data hoards.  I set out what discipline for
data hoards should look like.  I also address distinctions between different
types of data gathering and show how to distinguish amongst different data
hoards and their threats to associational freedom.
In short, we have lost our way.  We apply rules based on tangible, high-
cost analog things to a world of ever-changing, digital surveillance and to
data that is inexpensive to gather and store, easy to analyze, and that can be
put to many uses.50  Many of these uses threaten associational freedom but
48 388 U.S. 41, 64–66 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
49 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
50 Cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (requiring a warrant before
searching an arrestee’s cellular phone because of the quantitative and qualitative differ-
ence between searching notes in one’s pockets and the material stored on a cell phone);
id. (“A conclusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s pockets works no substan-
tial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may make sense as applied to
physical items, but any extension of that reasoning to digital data has to rest on its own
bottom.”).  The Court explicitly stated that the ruling did not reach Fourth Amendment
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are unregulated.  There is, however, hope.  Returning to insights from
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence addressing technology and surveillance
explains the associational problems in both forward- and backward-looking
surveillance and reinvigorates our standard for protecting that freedom.
This approach thus offers a foundation for calls to protect us from law
enforcement’s ability to probe our reading, meeting, and gathering habits—
our associational freedom—even though those acts are not private or speech,
and it explains what the constitutional limits on surveillance in the age of
data hoarding must be.
I. THE CONSTITUTION FAVORS ENABLING AND MAKING ASSOCIATIONS
Protecting associational freedom as an independent, core right is an
underappreciated aspect of the Constitution.51  From the Founding to the
present, Americans have assembled to share ideas, debate, organize, demon-
strate, plan petitions, engage in philanthropy, and more.  The way those
activities occur has changed over time.  Early groups relied on word of
mouth, letters, newspapers, and pamphlets to build associations and in some
cases take action.  Then came the telephone, and the ability to organize
expanded and was less public.  Today, blogs, social networks, email, mobile
phones, and the Internet in general have increased associational activities.52
At each stage, government has sought to watch these activities and sometimes
prevent them.  Just as the advent of wiretaps, bugs, and other novel govern-
ment surveillance methods spawned landmark cases in Fourth Amendment
law and legislation to govern the surveillance of the day, the government’s
ability to track us with GPS technology and to grab vast amounts of data
about where we go, what we read, who we meet, and more demand a new
approach to managing modern surveillance.53  Without such action our asso-
issues related to “the collection or inspection of aggregated digital information”—the issue
this Article addresses. Id. at 2489 n.1.  “Because the United States and California agree
that these cases involve searches incident to arrest, these cases do not implicate the question
whether the collection or inspection of aggregated digital information amounts to a search
under other circumstances.” Id.
51 Underappreciated does not mean no work has been done.  Work by Tabatha Abu
El-Haj, Ashutosh Bhagwat, John Inazu, and Jason Mazzone has laid the foundation to
recapture association as an independent right. See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected
Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543, 589 (2009) (“[T]he right of assembly should not be
collapsed into the right of free expression.”); Bhagwat, supra note 18 (demonstrating that
associational rights historically were independent of free speech and press rights); John D.
Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565 (2010) (exploring the history of
the freedom of assembly and the consequences of its declining importance in American
legal and political theory); Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639
(2002) (analyzing popular sovereignty, not free speech, as the basis for freedom of
assembly).
52 See Swire, supra note 19, at 1377–80 (discussing the role that social networks,
Internet, blogs, and email play in creating associations).
53 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amend-
ment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 797 (2008) (“[T]his Article
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ciational freedom is in jeopardy, for if we don’t protect the infrastructure of
associational freedom, future speech or action that might emerge is
thwarted.
Associational freedom is not only vital, yet misunderstood, within First
Amendment jurisprudence; it underlies key aspects of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.  Recognizing this function reveals why and how we must man-
age surveillance.54  It also shows that these concerns are not about whether
an act or data is public or private.  The solution will end up relying on new
procedures to address data gathering, analysis, and storage.  That result may
seem obvious.  Yet, such a shift would regulate the ability to use forward-
looking surveillance and the ability to engage in backward-looking surveil-
lance.  Analysis of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence shows that the Fourth
Amendment protects associational freedom.  General warrants, dragnet
searches, and other broad approaches to surveillance are not allowed.  The
reason we don’t allow them is not a reasonable expectation of privacy logic as
it is currently understood.  We don’t allow such practices, because they go to
the heart of how the state may misuse its power to chill, if not eliminate,
noncriminal activities it doesn’t like.  In short, the Constitution protects asso-
ciational freedom.55
A. Associational Freedom Protects Acts Other than Speech
Protecting associational freedom as an independent right, separate from
speech, unlocks the sort of political engagement and freedom of thought the
Constitution fosters and requires.56  Individuals and groups need space to
meet and network and to share, explore, accept, and reject ideas and then
choose whether to speak; these are the sorts of activities associational free-
dom shields.  As discussed further below, recent changes in computing, data,
and online practices are creating a decisive shift from forward-looking to
therefore considers how the First Amendment, as interpreted in light of modern technol-
ogy, might serve as an independent source of limitations on relational surveillance.”).
54 Daniel Solove and Katherine Strandburg have written about First Amendment con-
nections to Fourth Amendment doctrine and association. See Solove, supra note 5, at
132–33; Strandburg, supra note 53, at 768–93.  Both identify and explain ways in which
First Amendment concerns are important to and might discipline Fourth Amendment
information gathering issues.  This Article agrees with many of their insights and seeks to
build and advance them by drawing on and applying recent First Amendment scholarship.
In addition, this Article adds to the analysis and argues that Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence recognizes associational freedom as a Fourth Amendment matter.
55 Cf. Solove, supra note 5, at 163–64 (explaining that the Court has “pollinate[d] one
amendment with concepts from another” and that “[a] close relationship . . . exists
between the First and Fourth Amendments”).
56 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ.,
concurring) (“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties . . . . They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth . . . .”); see also Richards, supra note 17, at 395–98 (tracing the different ways
freedom of thought has been described as an integral act protected by the Constitution).
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backward-looking investigations.  These technological shifts make the risks to
associational freedom far more acute, in part because today much of the
infrastructure that enables association flows through third party technolo-
gies.57  Privacy scholars agree that the Fourth Amendment does not protect
association well, in part because the Supreme Court has not recognized a
reasonable expectation of privacy in data given to a third party.58  That obser-
vation is correct.59  It does not, however, address associational freedom.
Thus privacy scholars have looked to the First Amendment to remedy the gap
in Fourth Amendment law.  Daniel Solove has argued that “the First Amend-
ment itself must be understood as an independent source of criminal proce-
dure rules.”60  Following that logic, Kathy Strandburg has looked specifically
at the problem of association, surveillance, and networks.  Strandburg looks
to associational interests to support why we should limit techniques that
detect patterns of association or associational activity but relies on the idea of
“expressive and intimate associations” as the defining characteristics of the
sorts of associations that are protected.61  She seeks to address the govern-
ment’s ability to gather and analyze public data to find out member lists,
which she sees as impinging on freedom of association.62  But Strandburg
follows the idea that freedom of association is about expressive association:
“The inquiry therefore must focus not on whether a specific association is
‘expressive,’ but on the likelihood that a particular instance of relational sur-
veillance will disclose membership in expressive associations.”63  This posi-
57 Solove, supra note 5, at 126–27 (“In the past, much speaking, association, and read-
ing occurred in secluded places, walled off from the rest of the world.  But with modern
technology, First Amendment activity occurs via e-mail, the Internet, and the telephone.  It
is no longer confined to private zones such as the home and no longer benefits from
Fourth Amendment protection.”).
58 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 5, at 123–27 (“The ability to keep personal papers and
records of associational ties private is a central First Amendment value.  But despite their
First Amendment importance, the broad subpoena power and the Fourth Amendment’s
third-party doctrine leave these documents unprotected from government scrutiny.”);
Strandburg, supra note 53, at 770 (“[T]he Supreme Court generally has not found a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy either in information that has been conveyed to a third
party or in communication traffic data.”); Swire, supra note 19, at 1404 (“U.S. courts have
found no general constitutional right, however, for individuals in the realm of data
privacy.”).
59 See infra notes 109–10.
60 Solove, supra note 5, at 117.
61 Strandburg, supra note 53, at 744, 749 (“Current legal doctrine, which centers on
‘privacy’ and hence on protecting the content of communications, does not adequately
account for the extent to which relational surveillance threatens to chill expressive associa-
tion in today’s networked world.”).
62 See id. at 794 (“Extensive government relational surveillance using network analysis
data mining techniques poses a serious threat to liberty because of its potential to chill
unpopular, yet legitimate, association, and also because of the chilling of legitimate associ-
ation caused by possibly incorrect assessment of both legitimate and illegitimate associa-
tional membership.”).
63 Id. at 802.
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tion leaves an open question: What protection exists for associational activity
that is not expressive or potentially expressive?  I agree about the need to
protect associational activity, but I argue that the broader notion of associa-
tion in the First and the Fourth Amendment as presented here—one that
looks beyond expressive association—provides greater protection for associa-
tional freedom as threatened by the power of new data generation and analy-
sis and modern surveillance techniques.64
In simplest terms, associational freedom is about and protects the activi-
ties that can foster speech and lead to self-governance.  Recent scholarship
has shown that the right of association is an important right and distinct from
speech.65  The right is not set out in the Constitution;66 it flows from the
assembly and petition rights in the First Amendment.67  At and even before
the Founding, assembly, petition, and association rights “were essential com-
ponents of political activism” that predated speech rights.68  Originally,
assembly referred to “ad hoc gatherings of citizens,” and associations to
“more permanent . . . organizations.”69  Assembly and association began as
and are separate ideas, but the Court has conflated them over time.70  That
shift is a subtle, but powerful, mistake, because it reduces, and in some cases
eliminates, proper, full protection for the acts that come before speech and
are not expressive but that we need for associational freedom in any context.
The components of associational freedom work together to allow peo-
ple, especially those without power, to identify problems and demand
64 One should not infer that Solove and Strandburg do not understand freedom of
association.  I am indebted to their work for this Article.  Instead, one should note that the
bulk of scholarship about association began and has continued just after the scholars had
published their works, and so they did not have access to it.  In other words, I seek to
introduce this body of scholarship to privacy scholarship.
65 See Bhagwat, supra note 18, at 980–81.
66 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Assembly Resurrected, 91 TEX. L. REV. 351, 358 n.55 (2012)
(reviewing JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
(2012)).
67 See Bhagwat, supra note 18, at 980–81.  There is some debate about whether associa-
tion is a form of assembly and whether the assembly clause only protects assembly for the
purpose of petitioning. See id. at 990–91.  Nonetheless, Inazu’s work has made a strong
case against that position, and scholars agree that “assembly and association were essential
components of political activism, from the precolonial period through the American
Revolution and the nineteenth century.” Id. at 991.
68 Id. at 991.
69 Id. at 982–83; accord Inazu, supra note 51, at 566.
70 See Mazzone, supra note 51, at 714–15 (“[A]ssembly and petition were not simply
afterthoughts to free speech and free press.  Rather, they originated in a separate proposed
amendment. . . . Madison’s original proposal combines assembly and petition in the same
amendment, underscoring that these rights are linked.”); see also Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (“Nor is the Syndicalism Act as applied in this case repugnant to the
due process clause as a restraint of the rights of free speech, assembly, and association.”).
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change.71  The simplest aspect of this dynamic is the right to petition.72  Peti-
tioners “asserted not just their right to petition but also the right to ‘meet
together to frame and promote petitions.’”73  Despite the lack of a speech
right for American colonists, private grievances, public issues, and corruption
were addressed by petition.74  Petition also aided those without power.  Dis-
enfranchised groups “such as women, felons, Indians, aliens, and slaves—
were nonetheless able to express their grievances, and seek benefits, through
petitions.”75  Petition was influential in political fights over the Alien, Sedi-
tion, and Naturalization Act in the late 1700s, abolition, prohibition, and
women’s suffrage.76  Petition thus plays an important role as part of popular
sovereignty and self-governance by protecting “framing and meeting” and as
a right for those who do not have speech rights, but petition reaches its full
potential with another part of associational freedom—assembly.
Assemblies are not always public or expressive or engaged in petitioning
or even permanent, and yet they are protected.77  Assembly is about the abil-
ity of groups to think about, support, and dissent from (albeit peacefully)
current notions of the good.78  Some assemblies are permanent associations
that combined with petitions “allow specific groups to formulate programs
and demands, and to influence the course of government.  Assembly in a
constitutional convention permits the political collectivity—the People—to
change their government entirely.”79  Assembly need not be at the level of a
constitutional convention to matter.  Consider the history of women’s clubs.
Since the time of the Mayflower through the Civil War to the suffrage move-
ment, women used clubs to discuss issues frowned upon by those in power.80
Women’s ongoing and evolving role in “political life was born out of their
early association with other members on the basis of shared interests and a
search for solidarity.”81  Other examples of assembly were more public and
temporary.  Street meetings, demonstrations, election-day celebrations,
parades, and strikes were common assembly practices that “played a central
71 See Bhagwat, supra note 18, at 1003; Inazu, supra note 51, at 612 (observing that
“dissenting, public, and expressive groups [have] sought refuge under the right of
assembly”).
72 Petition is the formal request to the government to right a wrong or give a privilege.
See Mazzone, supra note 51, at 720.  The right existed in England since the thirteenth
century, but by the seventeenth century, petitioning moved from being submitted mainly
by individuals to being group petitions submitted by “[p]rivate associations.” Id. at 723
(quoting David Zaret, Petitions and the “Invention” of Public Opinion in the English Revolution,
101 AM. J. SOC. 1497, 1525 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73 Id. at 723 (quoting Zaret, supra note 72, at 1525).
74 Id. at 724.
75 Id. at 724–25.
76 Id. at 727–29.
77 Inazu, supra note 51, at 576–77.
78 Id. at 576.
79 Mazzone, supra note 51, at 730 (footnote omitted).
80 See id. at 642–44.
81 Id. at 644.
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role in American politics through much of the nineteenth century.”82  These
different, protected acts enabled and were part of political participation, but
were not necessarily about direct petition or expressive speech.  These acts
were important ways to share ideas, persuade others to action, demonstrate
the scope of support for a cause, and then petition or take other political
action such as forming a more permanent political group.83
Of course, those in power don’t always want to hear from opposing views
or even let opposing groups start, let alone thrive.  Members of the new
American government quickly changed their minds about associations and
saw them as threats to their power.  No less than George Washington
denounced associations in his 1796 farewell address as President.84  The
Democratic-Republican Societies, which believed that “the new government
was insufficiently responsive to popular will, and that some additional mecha-
nism was needed to keep elected officials in check,” caused particular con-
cern.85  Much like political groups from the Tea Party to the Occupy Wall
Street movement today, the societies were dispersed and sought to highlight
and debate public issues, published work critical of the incumbent govern-
ment, and “engaged in practical activities, like poll watching, philanthropy,
[and] tracking the voting of representatives.”86  Furthermore, there is some
evidence that some members of the societies participated in the Whiskey
Rebellion of 1794.87  Even though the Democratic-Republican Societies had
dissolved, the Sedition Act was passed in 1798.88  The act criminalized assem-
bly and speech separately.89
The structure of the Act shows the drafters knew the difference between
stopping speech and stopping the precursors to speech; if one can stop meet-
ings and the ability to share ideas, speech and political action may never
occur.90  Section 2 is more well known and criticized for its criminalization of
speech against the government (i.e., sedition).  But section 1 reveals the
understanding that non-speech activities are important and powerful.  Sec-
82 Abu El-Haj, supra note 51, at 555–61.
83 Id. at 560 (describing the interplay between assembly and petition).
84 See Mazzone, supra note 51, at 740.  Although fear of factions was part of the con-
cern the societies raised, Mazzone shows that Washington was a “zealous critic of the early
associations,” and in his private letters he argued that assemblies were illegitimate because
they were “self-constituted, rather than popularly elected.” Id. at 738–39.  “They are per-
manent assemblies, ready to criticize everything Congress does, rather than occasional
gatherings in response to specific legislation.” Id.  Mazzone distinguishes modern com-
mentators’ focus on Madison and factions from Washington’s hostility towards assemblies
and notes that Madison urged Washington to temper his views on this point. Id. at 739
n.600.
85 Id. at 734.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 735.
88 See Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, 596–97 (expired 1801).
89 Id. §§ 1–2.
90 Cf. Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations: Theoretically and Empiri-
cally Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 92 (2014) (explaining the need
for individuals to be able to connect groups to have large scale political action).
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tion 1 attacked associational freedom and non-speech activities by criminaliz-
ing and prohibiting people from “unlawfully combin[ing] or conspir[ing]
together, with intent to oppose any measure or measures of the government
of the United States.”91  Yet overt attacks on associational freedom are not
the only way we can lose associational freedom.
Attacking association’s infrastructure can defeat association’s power.
Yesterday’s clubs and street meetings are today’s activist groups, meet ups,
and flash mobs.  If one doubts that modern, data-driven and generating ser-
vices foster and inform political association and action, recall that the Arab
Spring, U.S. charities, and political campaigns such as the 2007 Obama cam-
paign, Tea Party campaigns, and more have thrived by using modern
networking and association technology.92  Threats to the way these groups
and other associations are formed and maintained provide another angle by
which the government can undermine associational freedom.  Part of the
problem is that backward-looking surveillance chills association, because the
government can dig into our past and find out the ideas, groups, or people
we engaged with all too easily.  An analog example in NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson93 shows how easy it is to undermine association’s infrastructure.
Alabama had a law that required the NAACP to disclose “all its Alabama
members and agents, without regard to their positions or functions in the
Association.”94  The Court did not allow access to the NAACP member lists,
because “[e]ffective advocacy” was bolstered by “group association.”95
Recent work by Tabatha Abu El-Haj shows that this position is borne out by
sociology.  The ability of individuals to connect disparate groups “has the
potential to create ‘scale shift.’”96  A scale shift happens when individuals
“‘make connections among groups that would otherwise be isolated from
one another’ and is necessary for a major social or political transformation to
occur.”97  Another important part of the NAACP Court’s logic was that the
group at issue faced threats and true violence if they were known.  That idea
connects to Bhagwat’s insight that associational analysis often turns on pro-
tecting those out of power and the persecuted.98  When the state requires
member lists to be disclosed, it chills the willingness even to join a group.
Thus fewer people will be willing to hear new ideas, let alone coordinate
activity to reach the sort of scale shift that can lead to political action in gen-
eral—especially by those out of power.  And yet, NAACP started a change in
91 § 1, 1 Stat. at 596; see also Mazzone supra note 51, at 740.
92 See Swire, supra note 19, at 1371 (discussing how social networks create
associations).
93 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
94 Id. at 451.
95 Id. at 460, 466.
96 Abu El-Haj, supra note 90, at 92.
97 Id. (quoting Sidney Tarrow, Dynamics of Diffusion: Mechanisms, Institutions, and Scale
Shift, in THE DIFFUSION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 204, 215 (Rebecca Kolins Givan et al. eds.,
2010)).
98 See Bhagwat, supra note 18, at 1003–14.
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perspective that hides the importance of a broad understanding of
association.99
Losing the distinction between associational freedoms and speech incor-
rectly subsumes the freedoms under speech and so lessens their protec-
tion.100 NAACP started the decay that turned association into a servant of
speech.  Although NAACP shows that the ability to form and sustain associa-
tions is protected, and state action that chills association (in that case the law
compelling the production of the member lists) is unconstitutional, a key
idea in NAACP was that membership was protected if it was part of free
speech—“[t]he Association . . . is but the medium through which its individ-
ual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own
views”—but not by itself.101  This view leaves non-speech activities in jeop-
ardy.  As Bhagwat has shown, there is an irony in that “invok[ing] the connec-
tion with free speech . . . restrict[s] [association] by rejecting constitutional
protection for associations that are not predominantly expressive.”102
Instead of robust protection for a range of associations and associational
activities, the right of association is now afforded only to expressive associa-
tions or “freedom of an association to speak.”103  This approach reduces asso-
ciation and assembly from being “independent political freedom[s]” to being
“an aspect of free speech.”104
99 As Ashutosh Bhagwat has explained, a series of cases—from Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927), to American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950)—
reveal that the Court continued to see speech, press, assembly, and petition “as cognate
rights that in combination constitute ‘the indispensible democratic freedoms secured by
the First Amendment.’”  Bhagwat, supra note 18, at 983–86 (quoting Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).  Then came NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson and its progeny,
and the perspective was lost. Id.
100 Cf. Abu El-Haj, supra note 51, at 589 (“[T]he right of assembly should not be col-
lapsed into the right of free expression.”).
101 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958).  On a related point,
when faced with a statute trying to prohibit the NAACP from aiding in litigation to which it
was not a party, the Court treated litigation as part of speech and ignored the petition.  Yet
litigation falls under petition easily and stands on its own. See Bhagwat, supra note 18, at
986.  Thus the Court was again looking to expressive speech and forgetting about associa-
tional freedom on its own.
102 See Bhagwat, supra note 18, at 988 (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted).
103 See Mazzone, supra note 51, at 678 (“Put differently, the Court purports to be analyz-
ing freedom of association when it is really analyzing freedom of expression.  The Court
seems to understand associations like the Jaycees or the Boy Scouts as just like any other
speaker with a message.  The Court treats government regulation of membership as raising
a constitutional problem only when the regulation interferes with the association’s mes-
sage, that is, where the presence of some individual interrupts what would otherwise be
said.  Freedom of expressive association is therefore reduced, in the Court’s analysis, to the
freedom of an association to speak.”).
104 See Bhagwat, supra note 18, at 986.  “[T]he Court abandoned its original insight that
association and assembly, while linked to free speech and press, are cognate, independent
rights.” Id. at 988–89.
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If, however, we grasp that the right of association applies to more than
only expressive associations or “freedom of an association to speak,”105 we
open the door to robust protection for a range of associations and associa-
tional activities.  These activities are about more than expressive speech.
Ignoring this point means we recreate the problems of the Sedition Act.
Recall that section 1 of the Sedition Act sought to prevent non-speech activ-
ity—“combin[ing] or conspir[ing] together, with intent to oppose any mea-
sure or measures of the government of the United States.”106  When the law
focuses on and protects only expressive speech, it limits speech-enabling
activity.  By focusing only on expressive associations, we fail to protect associa-
tional activity that is not such speech.  Instead of an obvious and easily objec-
tionable ban on assembly, as was the case with the Sedition Act, we simply
deny that assembly counts if it is not expressive.  In other words, neither asso-
ciational activities nor speech are spontaneously generated, and we must
beware of acts or laws that attack the seeds of action and speech just as the
Sedition Act sought to do.
Associations need room to form, grow, and have a chance to be part of
the political process.107  Associational freedom is a key to self-governance
and must be protected to preserve our ability to self-govern.108  Self-govern-
ance requires the ability to have private debate, coordinate activity, explore
ideas, and develop arguments and skills for public engagement, without gov-
ernment oversight or control.109  As Bhagwat has said, a key purpose of the
First Amendment is “to protect the process of forming and maintaining”
associations.110  We need to communicate our views, build coalitions and
consensus, and recruit unknown, but like-minded people.111  We need pub-
lic speech not only to attract others to associate, but to maintain associations
at all, and we need associational activity that is free from government over-
105 Mazzone, supra note 51, at 678.
106 Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, § 1, 1 Stat. 596, 596 (expired 1801).
107 See Abu El-Haj, supra note 90, at 54–60; cf. Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1912 (2013) (arguing that surveillance diminishes the capacity for
“democratic self-govern[ance]” because individuals no longer have the space to develop
their version of citizenship rather than one dictated or shaped by the state).
108 See Bhagwat, supra note 18, at 981.
109 See Solove, supra note 5, at 121–22 (“[P]olitical discourse does not just occur on
soapboxes before large crowds; it also thrives in private enclaves between small groups of
people.  Freedom of speech should and does protect the ability of individuals to communi-
cate with each other, regardless of whether the exchange of ideas occurs between two
people or among a million.  In other words, the First Amendment safeguards not just
speeches and rallies but conversations.  People formulate their political opinions and debate
politics mostly off-stage, between friends, family, and acquaintances, among fellow relig-
ious worshippers, and within groups with shared values and commitments.  Such conversa-
tions depend upon privacy.  Without protection against government probing, countless
conversations might never occur or might be carried on in more muted and cautious
tones.”); cf. Richards, supra note 17, at 387 (arguing that records of intellectual activities
must be protected because those activities are vital to “free thought and expression”).
110 Bhagwat, supra note 18, at 998; accord Abu El-Haj, supra note 51.
111 See Bhagwat, supra note 18, at 998.
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sight to enable further public speech.112  We need that freedom, because it
permits dissent a chance to become action.
In short, the precursors to speech must be protected if we are to have
speech and self-governance.113  Today, the precursors to speech are fueled
and mapped by our data-generating activities but are barely protected.
Something deemed content—what was said on a phone or the message in an
email—is given higher protection than envelope or metadata.  Content fits
well within standard views of speech.  Envelope and metadata do not and are
thus mistakenly under-protected; so much so that standard doctrine is that
data handed to third parties is public and the Fourth Amendment does not
protect public matters.114  In other words, this dichotomy tracks the mistake
of thinking that the First Amendment is only about speech and does not
protect the means to “forming and maintaining” associations.  Nonetheless, I
argue that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has a tradition of protecting
associational freedom and things done in or shared with the public.
B. Associational Freedom Protects Public Acts
Like the First Amendment mistake of ignoring associational freedom as
an independent interest protecting acts that are not speech, one can miss the
way the Fourth Amendment protects associational freedom as something
more than derivative of speech or privacy.115  Unfortunately, as soon as the
Fourth Amendment is raised, cases and scholarship are drawn to the reasona-
ble expectation of privacy test like a black hole.116  The emphasis is on
whether an act is private rather than whether the surveillance is reasona-
ble.117  Many acts that are part of associational freedom are given short shrift
112 Id. at 998–99 (“To achieve the structural purposes of the First Amendment, there-
fore, one of the primary objects of First Amendment doctrine must be to protect speech,
the function of which is to form and maintain associations and to communicate an associa-
tion’s views to outsiders—what I denote as associational speech.”).
113 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“An individual’s freedom to
speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not
be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to
engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”); accord Swire, supra
note 19, at 1385–86.
114 Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring)
(suggesting that such data will obtain constitutional protection if the Court’s “Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy”).
115 But see Solove, supra note 5, at 165 n.285 (acknowledging that Berger addresses how
to tailor electronic surveillance to meet Fourth Amendment particularity requirements).
116 Cf. id. at 131 (“[A]lthough they overlap to some degree, the First and the Fourth
Amendments protect different things.  The Fourth Amendment is currently understood by
the Court to protect privacy, and the test for determining the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment is the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy.  First Amendment activity, in
contrast, can be hindered without a violation of privacy, such as when the government
engages in public surveillance of political activity.” (footnote omitted)).
117 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 769
(1994).  As we shall see, a reasonableness inquiry encompasses preventing or limiting sur-
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because of the false belief that the Fourth Amendment only protects private,
secret acts.118  Recognizing associational protections under the Fourth
Amendment brings the doctrine in line with the First Amendment and
explains why certain surveillance practices should not be allowed even if the
information is public.
Criminal procedure is sensitive to and protects associational freedom,
but protection of associational interests is not absolute.  For example, crimi-
nal associations do not receive protection.119  Nonetheless, in Berger v. New
York,120 Katz v. United States,121 Kyllo v. United States,122 and United States v.
Jones,123 all of which involved surveillance of criminals, the Court raised
implicit associational concerns as part of its Fourth Amendment analysis.124
It appeared when the Court addressed the law enforcement practices at issue,
the type of activity that may be affected by those practices, and the solutions
offered to balance between detecting criminal activity while avoiding sweep-
ing noncriminal activity into the detection.  Thus I argue that the Court
wants to ensure that associational activities are not swept up with criminal
ones, because that limits the chance that surveillance will squash associa-
tional freedom and chill future associational acts.
The Fourth Amendment has a history of protecting associational free-
dom.125  The Amendments trace their roots to the history of seditious libel
veillance that implicates associational freedom even for public acts or information. See
infra notes 129, 173, 182 and accompanying text.
118 Cf. Amar, supra note 117, at 769 (explaining that some searches in public spaces
would be unreasonable).
119 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 18, at 1008–09 (noting that criminal organizations
such as the mafia are not protected as associations under the First Amendment).  The First
Amendment also affords less, and sometimes no, protection to certain types of speech. See,
e.g., Solove, supra note 5, at 153 (“Obscenity, fighting words, and child pornography are
considered low-value speech and receive diminished First Amendment protection.  The
Court has also not considered conspiracy, quid pro quo sexual harassment, insider trading,
and other forms of communicative activity to be protected speech.” (footnotes omitted)).
120 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
121 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
122 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
123 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
124 Daniel Solove’s work on the First Amendment and criminal procedure has clarified
that the few cases where the First and Fourth Amendment have explicitly intersected have
required warrants.  That point fits within this Article’s recommendation and indeed part of
Solove’s conclusion.  As he points out, however, the “[o]pen [q]uestion” is “what proce-
dures should apply when First Amendment activity falls outside the scope of current
Fourth and Fifth Amendment protection.” See Solove, supra note 5, at 128–30.  Solove’s
work informs much of this Article, but as he uses a narrower definition of association and
at the same time addresses a broad range of First Amendment concerns, this Article seeks
to add to his work by providing a definition of associational freedom that addresses his
open question in the context of data protection and that shows how associational concerns
are also found in the Fourth Amendment.
125 Solove has argued that the history and case law require reading the Fourth Amend-
ment with the First Amendment.  Solove, supra note 5, at 132–142.  As Akhil Amar has said,
“our Constitution is a single document . . . not a jumble of disconnected clauses.”  Akhil
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laws and numerous prosecutions in Britain and the American colonies used
“to suppress criticism of the government.”126  As William Stuntz has
explained, cases protected First Amendment interests before the First
Amendment existed.127  He argues that the law of search and seizure can be
seen as the “consequence of the strong tradition of using Fourth and Fifth
Amendment law as a shield against government information-gathering—a
tradition that has more to do with protecting free speech than with regulat-
ing the police.”128  I seek to amend the point and argue that the Constitution
protects associational freedom as well as speech, and draws on both the First
and Fourth Amendments to do so.
The way the Court has addressed the government’s use of surveillance
technology reveals associational freedom’s importance to Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence.  The deep concern, not over procedure, but over how a
lack of procedure allows new technology to threaten associational freedom is
the key to understanding how to regulate surveillance.  For example, real
time tracking of someone—be it with GPS or some other technology—raises
associational freedom issues just as bugging and wiretapping does.  As we will
see, modern warrant procedures emerged to manage the tension between
policing and associational freedom.129  Before we explore how those proce-
dures operate, we have to understand the sorts of acts that threatened associ-
ational freedom.
Even the relatively unsophisticated technology of the 1960s allowed for
unsupervised, ongoing, and secret surveillance that threatened associational
freedom and could not be allowed without a warrant.  In Berger, law enforce-
ment placed a recording device on a person and in the office of a liquor
board official suspected of corruption and demanding bribes.130  The Court
distinguished wiretapping from bugging.131  Bugging posed a larger threat,
because the proliferation of tiny recording devices allowed someone to
“eavesdrop[ ] on anyone in almost any given situation.”132  “[P]ostage stamp”
sized devices could “pick up whispers within a room and broadcast them half
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1201 (1991); accord
Solove, supra note 5, at 133.
126 William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 395
(1995).
127 See id. at 396–411.
128 Id. at 395.
129 But see Solove, supra note 5, at 128–30 (explaining that the few cases in which the
First and Fourth Amendments have explicitly intersected have required warrants but have
not answered “what procedures should apply when First Amendment activity falls outside
the scope of current Fourth and Fifth Amendment protection”). See Amar, supra note 117,
at 762–71 (arguing that warrants were distrusted in early Anglo-American law, are not
required by the text of the Fourth Amendment, and that the proper inquiry is about
reasonableness).
130 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44–45 (1967).
131 Id. at 47.
132 Id. at 46–47.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL204.txt unknown Seq: 25 30-DEC-14 13:03
2014] constitutional  limits  on  surveillance 603
a block away to a receiver.”133  The Court speculated, “[i]t is said that certain
types of electronic rays beamed at walls or glass windows are capable of catch-
ing voice vibrations as they are bounced off the surfaces.”134  That ability may
have been nascent in 1967; it is common today.  Even without speculation,
the Court had evidence of pervasive, undetected surveillance such as auto-
matic recording devices operated by remote control and “concealed in a
book, a lamp, or other unsuspected place in a room, or made into a fountain
pen, tie clasp, lapel button, or cuff link” which could send messages to some-
one a half mile away.135  The Court distrusted the new ability to record some-
one in secret.
The Court was quite clear that threats to associational freedom, even in
public spaces, were a major concern.  One might assume that the areas of
concern were private and where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy,
but that is incorrect.  In his concurrence, Justice Douglas compared bugging
to “plac[ing] a government agent” wherever we might go, including public
places.136  And Berger was decided the year prior to Katz, so the reasonable
expectation of privacy test had not yet been articulated, let alone adopted.
Even if the test’s logic and privacy were on the Court’s mind, Justice Douglas
was concerned about “anywhere” one might be bugged.137  Of his list of
places swept up in this surveillance, bedrooms, lawyer’s offices, and perhaps
business conferences may be private, but taverns, schools, trade groups, dry
cleaners, banks, and restaurants, are not.138  Protecting the ability to go to
133 Id. at 47.
134 Id.
135 Id.  Should one doubt that the Court was concerned about the hidden aspect of
surveillance, this passage further shows that the Court did not like that potential:
Receivers pick up the transmission with interference-free reception on a special
wave frequency.  And, of late, a combination mirror transmitter has been devel-
oped which permits not only sight but voice transmission up to 300 feet.  Like-
wise, parabolic microphones, which can overhear conversations without being
placed within the premises monitored, have been developed.
Id.
136 Id. at 64–65 (Douglas, J., concurring).
137 Id. at 65.
138 Id. at 64–66 (noting the capture of “conversations involving, at the other end, The
Juilliard School of Music, Brooklyn Law School, Consolidated Radio Artists, Western
Union, Mercantile Commercial Bank, several restaurants,” and recognizing that “[t]hese
cases are but a few of many demonstrating the sweeping nature of electronic total surveil-
lance as we know it today”).  On the importance of taverns for assembly, see also Baylen J.
Linnekin, “Tavern Talk” and the Origins of the Assembly Clause: Tracing the First Amendment’s
Assembly Clause Back to Its Roots in Colonial Taverns, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 593, 594
(2012) (“The proper situs of the Assembly Clause, research reveals, is in its birthplace:
colonial America’s taverns. . . . [C]olonial taverns served not just as establishments for
drinking alcohol but as vital centers where colonists of reputations great and small gath-
ered to read printed tracts, speak with one another on important issues of the day, debate
the news, organize boycotts, draft treatises and demands, plot the expulsion of their British
overlords, and establish a new nation.”).
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such places has to be about something other than keeping something fully
private.
I argue that the concern was that the surveillance at issue affected associ-
ational freedom.  Had the surveillance been conducted a few hundred years
ago, Douglas’s list could have said sewing circles or Democratic-Republican
Societies.  The places Douglas found to be too far afield from the criminal
investigation all fit into the places where historically people met, and today
still meet, to share ideas and form opinions.139  We limit and in some cases
eliminate the government’s ability to conduct continual, secret surveillance,
because that creates room for associational freedom to operate.  Associa-
tional freedom requires that we are able to meet, share ideas, and choose
whether to take action in public yet still remain private from government
oversight.140
Other cases involving surveillance further show that associational free-
dom is an important aspect of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Although
Katz v. United States141 has created much mayhem with the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test, it too is sensitive to associational freedom.  I argue that
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test has an associational component,
and when assessing whether someone’s expectation of privacy is objectively
reasonable, concerns over associational freedom are an objective standard
that must be part of that analysis.142  In Katz, the Court was quite clear that
the Fourth Amendment concerns more than privacy.143  The police had
adhered to many, if not all, requirements of a warrant.  They had, however,
failed to obtain one, and argued that the public nature of the phone booth
meant there was not a privacy problem requiring a warrant.  The Court
explained that someone does not give up their protection from surveillance
just because they are in “a business office, in a friend’s apartment,” or in a
“taxicab.”144  The phone had become a vital part of communication—one
might say an important part of “forming and maintaining associations”—and
the Court could not allow the executive to use its discretion about surveil-
lance instead of a neutral magistrate’s.  It is the analysis that goes into
obtaining a warrant that connects to and matters for associational free-
139 See Abu El-Haj, supra note 90, at 67 (explaining how recent movements used meet-
ings at “churches, cafes, and living rooms” to solve collective action problems and generate
political action but were not speech).
140 The 1976 Church Committee Report, which investigated intelligence practices of
the government, also recognized that surveillance by means of bugs, wiretaps, and more
captured “vast amounts of information about the personal lives, views, and associations of
American citizens.” See S. REP. NO. 94-755, supra note 24, at 5.
141 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
142 See Amar, supra note 117, at 806; accord Solove, supra note 5, at 118–19.  I thank
Brett Frischmann for pressing me to develop this point.
143 Id. at 350 & n.4.  The Court also acknowledged that some privacy concerns and
protections flowed from the First Amendment coverage of associational freedom. Id. at
350 n.5.
144 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (citations omitted).
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dom.145  As in Berger, the Katz Court required the executive to seek prior
permission to conduct surveillance of public places146 such as offices and
hotel rooms.147  One way to understand the Court’s concern and demand for
judicial oversight about the scope of the surveillance even in these somewhat
public spaces was that it sought to protect where meetings occur and to pro-
tect the facilities, such as a phone, that are part of and enable further associa-
tional activity.  In short, the Court was implicitly protecting associational
freedoms.  An additional way to understand associational freedom and the
Fourth Amendment is to ask whether surveillance captures lawful along with
unlawful activity.  In Kyllo v. United States, police used a thermal imaging
device to detect what was going on inside a suspect’s house.148  The Court
did not allow that type of surveillance because it reached intimate details
within the home.149  But it is a mistake to read that point too narrowly.  The
Court said limiting the prohibition to “intimate details” would “be wrong in
principle.”150  The Court reiterated and strengthened this point in Illinois v.
Caballes.151  In that case the police used a dog to sniff for illegal drugs.  The
Court distinguished that detection method from the one in Kyllo.  A critical
part of Kyllo was “the fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful
activity.”152  The Court held that the dog sniff was different, because it only
detected illegal activity.  In contrast, there is a “legitimate expectation that
information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private.”153  When sur-
veillance can sweep lawful activity into its net, there must be protection before
the surveillance commences, because “no police officer would be able to
know in advance” whether the surveillance might pick up lawful activity and
so “would be unable to know in advance whether it is constitutional.”154  And
here we can see the logic come together.
Lawful activities are to be free from government oversight.  Surveillance
that might capture those activities requires extra steps to be constitutionally
sound.  As an objective matter, associational freedom is not only a lawful
activity but a vital and core part of the type of activity that must not be chilled
by government surveillance.  Surveillance that implicates associational free-
dom requires limits and oversight.155
145 Cf. Amar, supra note 117, at 810 (noting that “if there are good reasons for sus-
pecting strong and systematic over-zealousness on the part of certain segments of executive
officialdom,” preclearance by the judiciary may be required).
146 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (citations omitted).
147 Id. at 358.
148 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
149 Id. at 37–39.
150 Id. at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005); accord Strandburg, supra note 53, at
761.
152 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
153 Id. at 410.
154 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39.
155 Cf. Solove, supra note 5, at 152 (stating that only information gathering implicating
“First Amendment values” should apply to limit government investigations).
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Associational concerns also help understand why the Jones Court recog-
nized tracking by GPS or other means as a problem.156  The issues at stake in
Berger have not vanished; they persist and reappear with tracking.  Early track-
ing cases looked at the use of a beeper, a device that sends a signal but
requires that law enforcement be near the tracking device to receive the loca-
tion and follow the subject.  Thirty years ago, in United States v. Knotts, the
Supreme Court allowed the use of such devices when someone is on a public
road, because beepers are seen as enhancing visual tracking, and because law
enforcement is allowed to follow someone in public areas.157  But a vital fact
supported that holding.  The Court found that the threat of law enforcement
abusing the technology to perform “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citi-
zen of this country . . . without judicial knowledge or supervision” was not
present.158  Public exposure mattered but continual surveillance was a strong
and equal part of the inquiry.  Unlike GPS trackers, beepers were not seen as
allowing easy, continual surveillance.159  The Court set aside the question of
whether beeper technology would lead to “dragnet” law enforcement.160
Questions about continual surveillance and judicial oversight are associa-
tional.  Although the Court did not directly address associational freedom, its
explicit discussion of easy, continual surveillance and dragnets shows the
Court was assessing potential harms to associational freedom as it assessed
reasonableness and surveillance.  If those concerns are present, the Court
will not allow surveillance absent oversight and other protections for associa-
tional freedom.
Whether prolonged surveillance even in public places harms associa-
tional freedom and thus alters the analysis—an issue Knotts acknowledged
but set aside—drives the divergence in courts’ decisions on that question.
When state intermediate appellate courts have found that a warrant was not
needed, they have found that driving on public roads negated privacy claims,
and that the short length of surveillance permitted the surveillance.161  In
contrast, three state supreme courts have found that the use of a tracking
device required a warrant.162  The logic of those cases is associational.  The
continuous surveillance possible with GPS tracking revealed “our associa-
156 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948–49, 954 (2012).
157 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
158 Id. at 283 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 9, Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (No. 81-1802))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
159 Id. at 285.
160 Id. at 284.  A year later, the Court refined the scope of when a beeper could be
used.  It prevented the warrantless use of a beeper, when it allowed law enforcement to
follow someone into a private place such as a home.  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
707–11, 719–21 (1984).
161 See Priscilla J. Smith et al., When the Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless Use of GPS
Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Searches, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 177, 178 n.7 (2011) (citing cases).
162 Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 366–67 (Mass. 2009); People v.
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1201–03 (N.Y. 2009); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 264 (Wash.
2003) (en banc).
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tions—political, religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a few.”163
Such detail went beyond the sort of data law enforcement might gather when
following a car with other methods of surveillance and violated the Fourth
Amendment, not because the acts were private, but because of the threats to
associational freedom.164  Federal circuit courts have differed on GPS track-
ing as well.165  As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
explained in United States v. Maynard, none of the cases addressed the ques-
tion whether the prolonged use of GPS tracking raised the associational con-
cerns explicitly set aside in Knotts.166  But even if they had, the issue seems
easily solved.
The simplest answer would be to require a warrant for any tracking; yet
the law already addresses warrants and tracking devices.  The Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure (the Rules) set out the procedures required when law
enforcement uses tracking devices.  The Rules appear to address all the con-
cerns GPS tracking raises.  The Rules do not, however, address when a war-
rant is required.  Just as with the history of wiretapping, the FBI has offered a
position on that question.167  The government analysis is that use of a war-
rant was preferable in general as it is “more likely to ful?ll the Fourth Amend-
ment’s reasonableness requirement.”168  Thus, the executive branch
recognizes that warrants help ensure compliance with the Fourth Amend-
ment.  And here is an irony. Jones may never have reached the Court had the
163 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199.
164 Id.
165 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the installation of the tracker was
not a search and so did not require a warrant.  United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th
Cir. 2007).  It did not address the issue of prolonged surveillance, because the appellant
had ceded that question. Id. at 996.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in
United States v. Pineda-Moreno permitted GPS tracking without a warrant, because it did not
find a difference between short and long-term surveillance and again the appellant had
ceded that Knotts controlled the issue of tracking in public.  591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir.
2010); accord United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 557–58 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled use of a GPS tracker was not a search and focused on the
method of installation, not the question of how long the tracking was used.  United States
v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010).
166 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.
167 Keith Hodges, Tracking “Bad Guys”: Legal Considerations in Using GPS, 76 FBI L.
ENFORCEMENT BULL., July 2007, at 25, available at http://leb.fbi.gov/2007-pdfs/leb-july-
2007.  During the history of wiretapping the Justice Department disfavored, and at times
rejected, using wiretaps as part of its enforcement arsenal.  Even J. Edgar Hoover and the
Treasury Department, who were not shy about aggressive law enforcement, took stands
against wiretapping by law enforcement.  Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Tech-
nologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 842–43 (2004).
After Congress banned wiretapping, the Court held that evidence from wiretapping was
inadmissible in court and anything gained from an illegal wiretap was also inadmissible as
“fruit of the poisonous tree.”  Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).  This
time, however, the Justice Department continued using wiretaps under the idea that they
could do so but not use what they found in court or divulge what they found. See Kerr,
supra, at 846.
168 Hodges, supra note 167, at 31.
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officers followed the warrant procedures for tracking in the warrant they had
obtained.169  What then was happening in Jones to prompt the Court to take a
simple failure to follow procedure case?  Why would two Justices craft concur-
rences with extensive discussion of tracking? Jones is about more than proce-
dure or a specific technology.
Jones is about threats to associational freedom from the ability to have
sustained, possibly secret, mass surveillance.170  Neither the Jones Court nor
the Maynard court cites Berger, but Berger’s concerns are the key to under-
standing the problems tracking and other technology present.  This chart
illustrates the overlapping issues and how Berger’s concerns reappear in Jones.
Court’s Concern Berger v. New York United States v. Jones
Tracker which wasSmall, hidden bug that difficult to detect andMethod transmitted far away to law transmitted locationenforcement data
Unconstitutional warrant Failed to followProcedural failure procedure warrant procedure
“[P]laces a government agent in
the bedroom, in the business Like having “a very
conference, in the social hour, tiny constable”
in the lawyer’s office— hidden in one’s car.Police everywhere everywhere and anywhere a Jones, 132 S. Ct. at
‘bug’ can be placed.” Berger, 388 958 n.3 (Alito, J.,
U.S. at 64–65 (Douglas, J., concurring).
concurring).





Sixty days to bug someone “is expectations of
the equivalent of a series of privacy. . . . [F]or
intrusions, searches, and seizures four weeks, lawLength of time pursuant to a single showing of enforcement agents
probable cause.” Berger, 388 tracked every
U.S. at 59. movement that
respondent made in
the vehicle he was
driving.” Jones, 132 S.
Ct. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
169 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 n.11 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
170 As one study has shown, the cost to track individuals has dropped from more than
$250 an hour for covert pursuit by officers to $10 per hour with a GPS device and $5.21 per
hour with cellular phone tracking. See, e.g., Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny
Constables and the Cost of Surveillance: Making Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 335, 353–54 (2014).
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Makes available “at a
relatively low cost
such a substantialThe proliferation of tinyPervasive, quantum of intimaterecording devices could allowinexpensive, and easy information aboutsomeone to “eavesdrop[ ] onto use technology any person whom theanyone in almost any giventhat can target Government, in itssituation” with no oversight.anyone unfettered discretion,Berger, 388 U.S. at 47. chooses to track.”
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at
956.
Surveillance “concealed in a “[C]heap in
book, a lamp, or other comparison to
unsuspected place in a room, or conventional
Use of spying made into a fountain pen, tie surveillance
technology clasp, lapel button, or cuff link” techniques and, by
could send messages to someone design, proceeds
a half mile away. Berger, 388 surreptitiously.” Jones,
U.S. at 47. 132 S. Ct. at 956.
One tap captured “conversations
involving, at the other end, The “[The] monitoring
Juilliard School of Music, generates a precise,
Brooklyn Law School, comprehensive
Consolidated Radio Artists, record of a person’s
Western Union, Mercantile public movements
Impinges Commercial Bank, several that reflects a wealth
associational freedom restaurants . . . . These cases are of detail about her
but a few of many familial, political,
demonstrating the sweeping professional,
nature of electronic total religious, and sexual
surveillance as we know it associations.” Jones,
today.” Berger, 388 U.S. at 65–66 132 S. Ct. at 955.
(Douglas, J., concurring).
Focusing on the method of detection is a mistake.  If instead we look to the
harms from tracking, we see that it poses harms that parallel the ones in
Berger.  Part of the Jones Court is addressing tracking because, just as in Berger
and Katz, the technology creates problems for the Fourth Amendment and
associational freedom by enabling “arbitrary exercises of police power” and
“a too permeating police surveillance” both of which threaten associational
freedom.171
One way to understand the concern is about scale.  There is a difference
between trying to place a cop everywhere and having the same effect through
technology.172  Consider that once we are in a park or share an idea with
171 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Di Re,
332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172 Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Court argues—and I agree—that ‘we must
assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.’  But it is almost impossible to think of late–18th-century
situations that are analogous to what took place in this case.” (citation omitted) (quoting
id. at 950 (majority opinion))).
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someone, we assume the risk that someone might see us, overhear us, or even
be an undercover agent.173  That person may even be wearing a bug and
recording us, yet there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment.  The differ-
ence, I argue, is that the Court is asking when secret surveillance (as opposed
to an obvious deployment of agents) poses a threat to associational freedom.
As Amar has argued, “secrecy does not necessarily equal unconstitutionality.
But it does raise a problem.”174  For Amar, the correct question is reasonable-
ness: “Simply put, are secret searches and seizures reasonable?”175  Orin Kerr
has argued that the Court recalibrates the Fourth Amendment depending on
whether the technology makes it “harder” or “substantially easier” for law
enforcement to obtain evidence.176  When harder, the Court lowers Fourth
Amendment protections.177  When substantially easier, the Court raises the
protections.178  But Kerr misses a core issue.  He sees the issue as a game of
cops and robbers with one side upping its game and forcing the other to
adapt.179  The rest of us, citizens, are missing from Kerr’s calculation.180
Rather than equilibrium as Kerr describes it, I argue that when the
Court encounters the power and scale of new surveillance technologies, it is
assessing reasonableness as a question of associational harm.  In that sense,
associational harm is a key way to understand equilibrium.  Tracking is a
“dramatic technological change” that is more powerful than bugging and
tapping, because it drops the cost of continual surveillance and allows it to
work in secret with no notice to the person under surveillance.181  The equi-
librium is upset.  But make no mistake.  Tracking is simply the latest example
of the larger problem.  Physical and cost barriers that helped prevent govern-
173 See Solove, supra note 5, at 127 (discussing a case in which the Supreme Court
found no Fourth Amendment violation when the defendant willingly spoke to an under-
cover agent because information voluntarily revealed to a police informant is not
protected).
174 Amar, supra note 117, at 803.
175 Id. (“And if the answer to our problem does not lie in a secret newfangled warrant,
neither does it lie in probable cause.  It lies in reasonableness.  Simply put, are secret
searches and seizures reasonable?  Regardless of one’s answer, at least one will be asking
the right question—talking sense rather than nonsense.”).
176 Kerr, supra note 2, at 480.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 481 (“The police continuously devise new ways to catch criminals.  Criminals
continuously devise new ways to avoid being caught.  This state of flux poses an underap-
preciated difficulty for judges interpreting the Fourth Amendment.  New facts constantly
threaten to upset the balance of police power.”).  Professor Susan Freiwald has argued that
surveillance that is “hidden, intrusive, indiscriminate, and continuous and therefore partic-
ularly susceptible to abuse” will move a court to find that a warrant is required.  See Susan
Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 53.  I agree
that these concerns fuel when a warrant is required and argue that the reason these factors
matter is that they affect associational freedom.
180 Cf. Ohm, supra note 2, at 1343–45 (arguing that balancing has to account for other
parties that benefit from a new technology).
181 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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ment’s overreaching surveillance are vanishing.  When those barriers go
away, it is too easy for the government to engage in continual, secret spying
that threatens associational freedom.182  We may have “tiny constables” every-
where and never know about it.183  Unfortunately, the government tends to
engage in such dubious practices all too often.  And today, the ability to
engage in such practices has increased.  Government can achieve the same
goals and create the same harms with backward-looking surveillance.  Under-
standing how we limit harms from forward-looking surveillance will help us
see why current practices for searching backward and maintaining data
hoards are unreasonable and further upset the balance between surveillance
and freedom.184
II. PROTECTING FUTURE AND PAST ASSOCIATIONAL FREEDOM
The concurrences in Jones raised concerns about the third party doctrine
and raised questions regarding what might be learned from data, because
those concerns and questions are part of backward-looking surveillance.  The
Court was calling out that such surveillance threatens associational freedom,
but we lack ways to manage this new threat.185  We can look backward and
harm associational freedom as much, if not more, than when looking for-
ward.  This Part explains how the procedural protections for forward-looking
surveillance reveal why and how we should protect associational freedom
from backward-looking surveillance.
182 Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605 (2007).
183 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“If a statute were to authorize placing a policeman in
every home or office where it was shown that there was probable cause to believe that
evidence of crime would be obtained, there is little doubt that it would be struck down as a
bald invasion of privacy, far worse than the general warrants prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment.  I can see no difference between such a statute and one authorizing elec-
tronic surveillance, which, in effect, places an invisible policeman in the home.  If any-
thing, the latter is more offensive because the homeowner is completely unaware of the
invasion of privacy.”); see also CLARKE ET AL., supra note 2, at 58 (detailing the history of
intelligence abuses and the historical concern that an intelligence agency operating in
secret “become a menace to a free government . . . because it carries with it the possibility
of abuses of power which are not always quickly apprehended or understood.” (quoting S.
REP. NO. 94-755, supra note 24, at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
184 Cf. Krent, supra note 14, at 51 (“My thesis is that the reasonableness of a seizure
extends to the uses that law enforcement authorities make of property and information
even after a lawful seizure.”).
185 This point is why scholars such as Cohen, Richards, and Solove have explored and
argued for greater recognition and protection of many activities that are public and not
expressive speech.
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A. Associational Freedom and the Protection of Future Acts
No one and no policy supports law enforcement attaching a device to
track someone’s every move.186  Yet, after a warrant has issued, law enforce-
ment may do just that for a limited time.  In simplest terms, United States v.
Jones addressed such a problem.  The government had used a technique,
failed to follow the warrant, and so violated the Fourth Amendment.187  As
Amar and Solove have argued, when surveillance and First Amendment con-
cerns intersect is precisely when such procedures are needed.188  Further-
more, “if there are good reasons for suspecting strong and systematic over-
zealousness on the part of certain segments of executive officialdom,”
preclearance by the judiciary may be required.189  Both concerns are present
with bugging, tracking, and wiretapping.  All require warrant procedures,
because they mitigate the potential harms to associational freedom.190
When forward-looking surveillance intersects with associational freedom,
surveillance must be limited or the purposes of the First and Fourth Amend-
ment are gutted.  Warrant procedure is central to how we manage surveil-
lance and civil liberties.  As the Court said in Berger, “[t]he purpose of the
probable-cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment [is] to keep the state
out of constitutionally protected areas until it has reason to believe that a
specific crime has been or is being committed.”191  Lack of prior review
means no check and balance is even possible.  A “neutral and detached
authority” must evaluate the warrant application to see whether probable
186 Cf. Rehnquist, supra note 43, at 9 (offering that a police stake out of a public place
such as a bar just to know who frequented it would not be allowed).
187 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49, 954.  Warrants are not magical and can be dangerous.  As
Amar has argued, we err when we assume that simply because a warrant has issued, Fourth
Amendment reasonableness demands are met.  Amar, supra note 117, at 802–03
(“[C]onsider electronic surveillance.  In love with the warrant, the Court has blessed hid-
den audio and video bugs—apparently even ones that must be installed by secret physical
trespass—so long as these bugs are approved in advance by judicial warrant.”).  A warrant
may issue but still run afoul of constitutional protection.  So too for statutes; just because
Congress passes a law—for example the Stored Communications Act—does not mean that
the law is constitutional.  The key point is to know under what circumstances reasonable-
ness may demand stronger procedures. See, e.g., Krent, supra note 14, at 63–77 (arguing
for a reasonableness standard for search and seizure of information).
188 Amar, supra note 117, at 806 (“First Amendment concerns could well trigger special
Fourth Amendment safeguards—heightened standards of justification prior to searching,
immediate (pre-search) appealability of any proposed search (with the premises sealed to
prevent interim destruction of evidence), specially trained nonpartisan marshals or magis-
trates or masters to carry out the search, and so on.”); Solove, supra note 5, at 132.
189 Amar, supra note 117, at 810.
190 Amar has argued that options other than a warrant per se such as “heightened stan-
dards of justification prior to searching, immediate (pre-search) appealability of any pro-
posed search (with the premises sealed to prevent interim destruction of evidence),
specially trained nonpartisan marshals or magistrates or masters to carry out the search,
and so on” would suffice. Id. at 806.  I do not disagree.  Rather, I here wish to show that
the Court seeks some of the same outcomes in its embrace of warrants.
191 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
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cause exists before issuing the warrant.192  As the Court said a year later in
Katz, this review is required because of surveillance’s secret nature and
because asking permission later would lead to “hindsight” bias rather than
“objective predetermination” that the surveillance should be permitted.193
Anything other than prior review leaves constitutional protection at “the dis-
cretion of the police.”194
When law enforcement can watch and record us without stating specifics
of a “particular offense” or the property to be seized—in other words, with-
out establishing probable cause—the order works as a general warrant.195  A
ban on practices that operate as general warrants is a mainstay of Fourth
Amendment law.196  Allowing officers to bug someone for sixty days “is the
equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a single
showing of probable cause.”197  Without a termination date surveillance can
persist even after the thing sought has been found.198  Lack of notice “per-
mits uncontested entry without any showing of exigent circumstances.”199
The secret recording of someone means they would never know that a search
or seizure occurred as they would with other searches and seizures.200  And,
because there is not a return on the warrant, the process for giving up the
information gathered, law enforcement could use “seized conversations of
innocent as well as guilty parties.”201  Together, these practices enable a
“blanket grant of permission to eavesdrop” in part because of the lack of
“adequate judicial supervision or protective procedures.”202  These types of
practices were rejected in Anglo-American jurisprudence beginning with
192 Id. at 54.
193 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358–59 (1967) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 96 (1964)); see also Krent, supra note 14, at 86 (arguing that law enforcement must pre-
commit at the legislative level to how it wants to use gathered information, because
“[p]rospectivity minimizes the chances for arbitrary action or action motivated by hidden
bias”).
194 Katz, 389 U.S. at 358–59 (quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 97).
195 Id. at 59–60.
196 Berger, 388 U.S. at 58.  Distrust of general warrants runs deep in U.S. history; outcry
over the use of general warrants motivated the writers of the Declaration of Independence.
Id.; see, e.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33–34 (1927).
197 Berger, 388 U.S. at 59.
198 Id. at 59–60.
199 Id. at 60; cf. Amar, supra note 117, at 803 (“Moreover, even though the warrant
contemplated by the Fourth Amendment would be issued ex parte, it would be served on
the owner or occupant of the searched premises, or left there, giving the target clear notice
of what had been searched or seized, and when.  This notification was contemporaneous
with the intrusion itself.  By contrast, targets of audio and video warrants may never learn
that they have been searched and that their words have been seized—or they may find out
years after the fact.”).
200 Even with warrants, when the act is secret and no one knows what was gathered, the
procedure goes against the “adversarial nature of Anglo-American judicial proceeding[ ].”
Amar, supra note 117, at 803.
201 Berger, 388 U.S. at 60; accord id. at 66.
202 Id. at 60.
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Wilkes v. Wood203 and Entick v. Carrington.204  They were rejected in the 1760s
and two hundred years later in the 1960s for the same reason: they were and
are “totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.”205  That liberty interest is
associational freedom.
Tracking technology has opened the door to a new type of dragnet that
requires us to remember the importance of freedom from surveillance.  This
dragnet evades the limits of a trespass approach to privacy.206  The trespass
approach to surveillance does important work, but it does not work alone.207
Some issues are not amenable to the trespass approach, because no touching
is required.  Recall that the Berger court was worried about “electronic rays
beamed at walls or glass windows . . . capable of catching voice vibrations as
they are bounced off the surfaces.”208  Trespass cannot address that possibil-
ity just as it cannot manage the problem of a tap on a public phone booth in
Katz.  In Jones, Justices Sotomayor and Alito showed how trespass fails to
address the larger implications of tracking.  Justice Sotomayor noted that
some “electronic or other novel modes of surveillance . . . do not depend
upon a physical invasion on property.”209  Justice Alito agreed with that con-
cern.210  Just like the Berger court, he speculated about things that might
come to pass.  He pointed out that the government might also “require[ ] or
persuade[ ]” installation of tracking mechanisms in all cars or might activate
a stolen vehicle tracker.211  Trespass would not address those possibilities,
but the harms to associational freedom would remain.  We do not have to
imagine technological dystopias to understand the harms here.  William
Rehnquist explained them forty years ago.  His example was prescient.
The question is not one of privacy as in acts or facts kept secret; the
problem lies in the government’s non-particularized surveillance of peo-
ple.212  Then-Justice Rehnquist suggested that one might place a police
203 (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.).
204 (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.).
205 Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498.
206 Insofar as trespass ideas in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence rely on property, I
agree with Amar that this view is oddly narrow and fits with Lochner style “[p]roperty wor-
ship.”  Amar, supra note 117, at 788–89.
207 Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012) (“But as we have discussed, the
Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the com-
mon-law trespassory test.”).
208 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 47 (1967).
209 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
210 Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court’s reliance on the law of trespass will
present particularly vexing problems in cases involving surveillance that is carried out by
making electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be tracked.”).
211 Id. at 961.
212 Rehnquist, supra note 43, at 11 (“The only claim of the government is a desire to
know what each of its citizens is doing without regard to whether that conduct is or might
be unlawful.  I think almost all of us would regard this as simply not the kind of govern-
mental interest that ought to rate high in a free society.”); accord CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 89–90
(2007).
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officer at a bar daily and take down all the license plate numbers for later
cross-referencing with the Department of Motor Vehicles records to gain “a
reasonably accurate list of people who patronize the bar.”213  He posited that
even if it were cost effective for the government to “keep a dossier of informa-
tion pertaining to every citizen” most would say we should not do so.214  Such
a power would create a “justified uneasiness,” because patrons would feel
their names were being “taken down and filed for future reference.”215
Today what Rehnquist called “an extreme” example is now an easy reality.216
As the Justices in the Jones concurrence stated, the cost issue alone has
changed.217  The possibility of low-cost surveillance was a reality in the 1960s
with bugging and has only become a less expensive and easier reality
today.218  As one study has shown, the cost to track individuals has dropped
from more than $250 an hour for covert pursuit by officers to $10 per hour
with a GPS device and $5.21 per hour with cellular phone tracking.219  The
cost drop makes it too easy to place an officer, or “tiny constable,” at every
tavern door or any other place we may go.220  With bugging, Justice Douglas
equated pervasive, secret electronic surveillance with deploying police in
every home or office.  He offered that even if a statute authorized doing so if
there was “probable cause to believe that evidence of crime would be
obtained, there is little doubt that it would be struck down as a bald invasion
of privacy, far worse than the general warrants prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment.”221  He then said that electronic surveillance would be worse
because we would be “completely unaware” of its presence.222  Tracking has
the same problem.  The Jones Court recognized the temptation and possibil-
ity to use the technology in ways that threaten associational freedom, and
thus demands stronger procedures to mitigate those potential harms.
Rehnquist’s other issue, the ability to maintain dossiers, has also come to
full fruition.223  That possibility connects to Justice Sotomayor’s concern over
surveillance of past activities.  Rather than having to set someone at a bar in
real time, law enforcement can access databases to get precise information
about someone at very low cost and end up with the same, if not a better,
dossier that Rehnquist recognized as undesired.224  That is why Justice
Sotomayor could connect tracking to the general problems “the digital age”
213 Rehnquist, supra note 43, at 9.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.; SLOBOGIN, supra note 212, at 89–90.
217 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
218 See, e.g., Bankston & Soltani, supra note 170, at 354.
219 Id.
220 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring).
221 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
222 Id.
223 See SOLOVE, supra note 9, at 1–26 (investigating the problems of digital dossiers).
224 Rehnquist, supra note 43, at 10 (“[T]his amount of information generally will be
physically impossible to compile, and . . . most of us would feel that such a dossier on every
citizen ought not to be compiled even if manpower were available to do it.”).
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poses for the third party doctrine.225  She recognized that the digital age has
opened the door to new threats to associational freedom and current law has
not kept pace with this change.
B. Tracking the Past Threatens Associational Freedom
Surveillance of our past actions threatens associational freedom at least
as much as surveillance of our future actions.  Calling someone, visiting a web
site, sending emails, and buying “books, groceries, and medications” all
involve third parties and leave behind traces of our activities.226  Our daily
lives generate data exhaust that allows law enforcement to figure out exactly
the same things that raise First and Fourth Amendment concerns for wiretap-
ping and tracking.227  That is why Justice Sotomayor asserted that “it may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third par-
ties.”228  As Rehnquist explained, these issues are not about privacy in the
sense of away from public eyes.229  The concerns about GPS and third parties
are important, because they are part of a larger problem.  We can now watch
someone for an extended period of time, secretly and inexpensively, going
forward, and we can do the same, if not more, going backwards.  We have
some sense of what to do about forward-looking surveillance.  We must
rethink backward-looking surveillance.230
Looking at data from a GPS company, a cellular phone company, a
search company, a credit card company, or a retailer reveals all the details of
that person’s life just as, or in greater detail, than continual monitoring.  No
sophisticated, big data analysis is required; the list tells you exactly where
someone went, what they bought, or what they read.231  It is all too easy to
225 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
226 Id.
227 See Solove, supra note 5, at 126–27.
228 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
229 Rehnquist, supra note 43, at 9.
230 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
231 A problem for another time is the mistaken understanding of the mosaic theory as
offered and what it must be in practice.  It is important enough that I raise it here nonethe-
less.  As a general matter, although several have tried to lay claim to the term “mosaic,” the
concept at least dates back to work done in 1986. See Anthony Paul Miller, Teleinformatics,
Transborder Data Flows and the Emerging Struggle for Information: An Introduction to the Arrival of
the New Information Age, 20 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 89, 111 (1986).  In other words,
mosaic seems to have different possible meanings.  As used in Jones mosaic can be read two
ways: one involves data mining and inferential claims about individual or group patterns
and behaviors, and the other involves ability to take specific data about someone and
assemble a picture of exactly what they did or said.  Although Justice Sotomayor and schol-
ars have looked to fears about the government using data to connect seemingly random
data to create a picture of our activities, that problem was not at stake in Jones.  Thus there
has been an unfortunate conflation of the idea of connecting trivial bits of data to under-
stand or see a pattern of behavior and the main issue with tracking: the ability to have a
map or list of all the places one has gone, with whom one has met, what one bought, or
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obtain this data, because the current approach to government information
gathering over-focuses on what is, or is not, content and in so doing misses
this type of data.  Content data—the substance of a letter, email, or phone
call—receive greater protection than non-content data and require a war-
rant.232  Non-content data such as a phone number obtained via a pen regis-
ter, business records, IP routing information, or tracking data do not require
a warrant and are easily obtained with a subpoena.233  The exact lists of our
movements, meetings, and readings are available for abuse, and the content/
non-content distinction fails to address the third party disclosure problems
that Justice Sotomayor raises.234
The premise that anything one discloses to a third party is available for
all to see is an absurdist conceit that increases the problems for protecting
what one read. See, e.g., David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98
MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013).  Citron and Gray take mosaics to be about connecting trivial bits
of information and offer that the law should “focus on how information is gathered.” Id. at
71–72.  For them, the key issue is “whether a technology has the capacity to facilitate broad
and indiscriminate surveillance.” Id.  If the technique “rais[es] the specter of a surveil-
lance state if deployment and use of that technology is left to the unfettered discretion of
law enforcement officers or other government agents,” the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy is not met and Fourth Amendment concerns are triggered. Id. at 72.  I differ by
showing two things.  First, gaining the sort of information that Jones and Citron and Gray
care about is not about connecting trivial bits of data.  It is about having accurate data,
accessing it, and seeing what one did.  Second, as discussed below, data generation, hoard-
ing, and analysis are not going away.  Thus I argue that the quantity of data does not
matter as much as whether data usage by law enforcement threatens associational freedom.
That analysis explains why a given practice matters.  After that, one can ask about
“bespoke” solutions depending on “upon the technology at issue” and “the law enforce-
ment interests it serves.” Id. at 72.
232 Professors Patricia Bellia and Susan Freiwald argue that those who believe that
email routing information and stored email are not content have “overread” Smith v. Mary-
land.  Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-mail, 2008
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 163–64. They distinguish numbers from what they call communica-
tions attributes. Id.; see also Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After
the Digital Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 953–54 (1996) (defining communication
attributes as “the existence, duration and subject matter of a communication, the identities
of the parties to it, their physical locations and their electronic addresses”).
233 For example, cell tower location data can reveal one’s travel habits in much the
same way that the GPS data at issue in Jones does.  The Fifth Circuit has characterized cell
tower location data as business records and thus held that no warrant is required for such
data. See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).  The Elev-
enth Circuit has held that cell tower data requires a warrant, but that ruling has been
vacated and set for en banc rehearing.  United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir.),
vacated and en banc reh’g granted, No. 12-12928, 2014 WL 4358411 (11th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014).
The courts’ struggle regarding cell tower data shows the problems with the content/non-
content approach to data that implicates associational freedom.
234 See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1216 (finding that even one cell phone data point may reveal
sensitive information akin to communication information).
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data exhaust.235  The cases that embrace this position rely on the idea that
business and corporate records are different than other personal records.236
The first cases on the subject looked to a distinction between corporate
records and personal records based on a conception of corporations as being
different than people and having less privacy interest in their business
records.237  That position crept until finally United States v. Miller extended
the idea that disclosure to a third party eliminated the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.238  Claiming that a random teller or other functionary could
recall the details of one record out of hundreds of transactions over many
days or from a transaction that occurred months or years ago stretches
credulity.
Even if one accepts that exposure to a person reduces or removes pro-
tection, the facts behind the idea belie that today’s reality maps to the old
one.  Once upon a time, perhaps phone numbers, bank records, and other
records were exposed to operators and banks tellers.  But when was the last
time someone spoke to an operator to give a number and place a call?  How
often do people speak to tellers to make a deposit or conduct other banking?
The elimination of human interaction is a standard business practice to
reduce cost.  Calls and call records are automated, as are banks.  GPS track-
ing, email accounts, online transactions, credit card purchases, are all
designed not to expose data to a human being.  The data is in the hands of
the company, but the convenient legal point about a third party seeing the
data is gone.  There is no meaningful exposure.  Now the mere possibility that
someone could access data is enough to have exposed the data in a way that
removes protection.239  And, as Rehnquist said, the issues are about more
than exposure.240  Remember associational freedom protects things exposed
235 Cf. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning the third party
doctrine and stating, “I do not regard as dispositive the fact that the Government might
obtain the fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful conventional surveillance techniques”).
236 See, e.g., id. (same); see also Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 232, at 148 (discussing
cases).  President Obama’s address regarding the NSA’s gathering of bulk data also relied
on this distinction as a way to claim that the program was not as invasive as it some argued.
See Transcript of NSA Reform Speech, supra note 12 (“In sum, the program does not involve
the NSA examining the phone records of ordinary Americans.  Rather, it consolidates
these records into a database that the government can query if it has a specific lead, a
consolidation of phone records that the companies already retain for business purposes.”).
237 See Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 232, at 150.
238 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
239 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that no search warrant was
required for the installation and use of a pen register (phone call monitoring system) as
there was no legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that were dialed);
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (holding that there is no Fourth Amendment protection to business
records of a bank such as original checks and deposit slips); accord Solove, supra note 5, at
125–26.
240 Accord United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir.) vacated and en banc reh’g
granted, No. 12-12928, 2014 WL 4358411 (11th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014); cf. Susan Freiwald, Cell
Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681
(2011) (addressing challenges new location technologies pose to courts applying the rea-
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to the public.  The better question is, private from whom?  With associational
freedom the answer is law enforcement.
Simply assuming law enforcement having access to all third party data
poses no threat or is always allowed fails to assess whether associational harm
is present.  To date, it might be that the world of analog recordkeeping had
built in cost limits and was not so secret, and so the Court was less concerned
about harms to associational freedom the legal fiction of exposure creates.241
Those analog days are gone.  We should not blithely accept that exposure to
some people allows law enforcement to use data and thus ignore the poten-
tial threats to associational freedom.  With digital records, the cost to track
and store our movements and our behaviors has dropped as much as, if not
more than, it has for GPS tracking.  Furthermore, bulk access to data about
one person, a specific group, or all of us is possible, and of late, the norm.  In
other words, data everywhere creates problems for associational freedom.
C. How Surveillance Chills and Data Tempts
Pervasive surveillance chills associational freedom.242  Chilling, or deter-
rence, from activities can occur through indirect actions.243  Several areas of
information gathering—“surveillance of political activities, identification of
anonymous speakers, prevention of the anonymous consumption of ideas,
discovery of associational ties to political groups, and enforcement of subpoe-
nas to the press or to third parties for information about reading habits”—
have been found to chill First Amendment activities.244  These activities are
not speech, yet they are protected.  I argue they are protected, because they
are part of associational freedom.  They are precursors to speech, indepen-
dently desired, and under threat from recent government data programs.
The mechanisms for information gathering have taken different forms
at different times in history, but regardless of the type of perceived threats to
society, the precise method of surveillance, or when the acts occur, too often
we can see a particular goal or outcome: suppression of association.245
Recent data harvesting can be understood as part of a history of government
sonable expectation of privacy test).  To be clear, the logic in Miller was that one assumes
the risk that once information is shared with another, it may be revealed “even if the infor-
mation is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.” Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
241 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“And because GPS monitoring
is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds
surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement prac-
tices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’” (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540
U.S. 419, 426 (2004))).
242 Solove, supra note 5, at 143.
243 Id. at 142–43.
244 Id. at 143.
245 For a survey of the history of different ways government has overreached and then
corrected attacks on civil liberties, see CLARKE ET AL., supra note 2, at 53–63.
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mass-surveillance programs that can trample associational freedom.246  Mail
has been read, student speech and political actions watched, and library
records obtained.247  In the 1950s the FBI collected names of suspected
Communists for use at congressional hearings including a security index of
26,000 people to arrest in case of a national security emergency.248  One fif-
teen-year-long program gathered information about “the Communist Party,
the Ku Klux Klan, antiwar groups, civil rights groups, women’s rights groups,
and gay rights groups.”249  And civil rights leader Martin Luther King was
threatened using information from surveillance activities.250  That work was
in addition to criminal prosecutions and spying on citizens.251  Today the
problem is that the amount of data available to engage in similar information
gathering is too easy to obtain and too tempting to ignore.
A large data set, a data hoard, may be accessed for a host of reasons:
some desired—many not.  Both the private sector and government keep such
hoards, and both present threats to associational freedom.  Government
might access a private data hoard by demanding specific data about someone
from a private data hoard.252  With enough individual dossiers, government
246 See Jennifer Stisa Grannick & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Criminal N.S.A., N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/opinion/the-criminal-nsa
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (arguing that the NSA PRISM program collecting large swaths
of American email and other communications violates the law).
247 See, e.g., Swire, System of Foreign Intelligence, supra note 2, at 1315–20 (listing a range
of intelligence activities that made up what has become called actions by “The Lawless
State”).
248 Solove, supra note 5, at 139.
249 Id.
250 See id. at 140.
251 Id.
252 One’s buying and reading habits on Amazon is an example of such data.  Spiros
Simitis identified the problem of private data revealing associational interests twenty-five
years ago.  Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707,
726 (1987) (“[T]he broad availability of personal data and . . . elaborate matching proce-
dures [mean] individual activities can be accurately reconstructed through automated
processing.”).  In response to this problem, Neil Richards has looked at private sector data
collection/sharing and called for the need to protect “the ability . . . to develop ideas and
beliefs away from the unwanted gaze or interference of others.”  Richards, supra note 17, at
389.  As Richards argues, these areas are not protected under traditional privacy analysis,
because it “misse[s]” the importance of these activities. Id. at 390.  Julie Cohen’s work on
privacy and play completes the picture by connecting the problems of data, freedom from
surveillance, and self-governance. See generally JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE
NETWORKED SELF (2012) (arguing that moving beyond the bounds of liberal political the-
ory is essential to understand intersections between different information rights regimes).
We want people to have the “capacity for critical independence of thought and judgment,”
“self-actualization and reason,” and “cosmopolitanism,” because these capacities allow peo-
ple to be full citizens of our society who can “identif[y]” and “pursu[e]” their personal and
political self-fulfillment.  Cohen, supra note 107, at 1911.  But those capacities need room
to develop, and in that sense we play. Id.  We explore ideas and “boundar[ies]” of roles
and social rules. Id.  Those acts must be private in that they should be free from oversight,
but they are also public in that we engage in play with others.
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will have a good-sized hoard.  Yet that takes time.  One way to get around that
effort is for government to acquire an entire private data hoard.  For exam-
ple, the FBI has gathered publicly available information “directly” through
third parties, or the information has been handed over “voluntarily” by third
parties.253  The NSA’s “Associational Tracking Program” has collected purely
domestic communication information, including from and to whom a call is
made, the length of the call, and when the call is made, on a daily basis for
later analysis by the NSA.254  This data has come directly from telecommuni-
cation providers such as Verizon, which complied with a court order.255  In
addition, the NSA has hacked telecommunication lines to gain access to com-
munications and metadata passing through Google and Yahoo data cen-
ters.256  Statements from the FBI indicate that it has received information
from the NSA, and there is evidence that Muslim-American leaders’ emails
have been monitored.257
253 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE
INVESTIGATIONS 21–22 (2002), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20030403072729/
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf.  The NSA’s recent activities map to behav-
iors that threaten and attack associational freedom.  The NSA has targeted online activities
of alleged Muslim radicalizers—those who offer troubling speeches—to secure informa-
tion, such as about viewing pornography online, to discredit or embarrass the speakers. See
Glenn Greenwald et al., Top-Secret Document Reveals NSA Spied on Porn Habits as Part of Plan to
Discredit “Radicalizers,” HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014, 6:58 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html.  To be clear, insofar as the
targets are not residents of the United States, they receive less protection from this type of
surveillance.  The related concern, as Jameel Jaffer of the American Civil Liberties Union
argues, is that one cannot tell whether the NSA is truly using a narrow focus as it conducts
these sorts of operations. Id.
254 See Complaint, First Unitarian Church of L.A. v. NSA, No. 4:13-CV-03287-JSW (N.D.
Cal. July 16, 2013), available at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/firstunitarianvnsa-final
.pdf; Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily,
GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
records-verizon-court-order.
255 See Exhibit A to Complaint, First Unitarian Church of L.A., No. 4:13-CV-03287-JSW.
Under FISA and the PRISM program, the NSA has also required Internet companies to
provide access to their servers. See, e.g., Steven Nelson, What If Yahoo Just Said “No”?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:44 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2014/09/12/what-if-yahoo-just-said-no-to-the-nsa (“Internal NSA documents released by
whistleblower Edward Snowden in June 2013 show that Microsoft in 2007 was the first
major company to participate in PRISM, followed by Yahoo and then Google, Facebook,
YouTube, Skype and others.  A slideshow released by Snowden says the program allows
direct access to the firms’ servers to collect information on targets, which Yahoo has pub-
licly disputed.”).
256 See Max Ehrenfreund, NSA Apparently Taps Google, Yahoo Networks Without Companies’
Knowledge, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-apparently-taps-google-yahoo-networks-without-companies-knowledge/2013/
10/30/f14749d0-4195-11e3-a751-f032898f2dbc_story.html.
257 See THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, NSA Argues to Keep Hacked Data, CED (Nov. 4, 2013, 12:28
AM), http://www.cedmagazine.com/news/2013/11/nsa-argues-to-keep-hacked-data (“If
Congress were to shut down the government’s collection of Americans’ phone records
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The amount of data available to government, regardless of source, cre-
ates a temptation for government to use data without limits.  It is exactly this
sort of temptation that can lead to “strong and systematic over-zealousness on
the part of certain segments of executive officialdom” and that demands
preclearance by the judiciary258 and other protections.  At least one study has
shown that fear of recent, unfettered government information gathering pro-
grams has chilled associational activities.
The nonprofit PEN America has shown that the government’s ability to
gather information directly or from third parties has chilled associational
activities of writers.259  The study found that:
• 28% have curtailed or avoided social media activities, and another 12%
have seriously considered doing so;
• 24% have deliberately avoided certain topics in phone or email conversa-
tions, and another 9% have seriously considered it;
• 16% have avoided writing or speaking about a particular topic, and
another 11% have seriously considered it;
• 16% have refrained from conducting Internet searches or visiting websites
on topics that may be considered controversial or suspicious, and another
12% have seriously considered it;
• 13% have taken extra steps to disguise or cover their digital footprints,
and another 11% have seriously considered it;
• 3% have declined opportunities to meet (in person, or electronically) peo-
ple who might be deemed security threats by the government, and
another 4% have seriously considered it.260
As scholars of association might say, with surveillance the room to disagree
about what the common good is diminishes.261
every day, which it has been secretly doing since 2006, ‘we wouldn’t be able to see the
patterns that the NSA’s programs provide us,’ said Patrick Kelley, acting general counsel of
the FBI.  Kelley added that the FBI would not be able to weed out significant phone data if
it did not have the NSA’s massive data bank to tap into, and would lose valuable time if it
had to instead seek the data from individual phone companies.”).  There is also evidence
that the FBI and NSA have monitored U.S. persons, specifically Muslim-Americans. See
Glenn Greenwald & Murtaza Hussain, Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA
Have Been Spying On, INTERCEPT (July 9, 2014), https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/
07/09/under-surveillance/.  The NSA is allowed to conduct surveillance on non-U.S. per-
sons and has done so in tracking information including porn-watching habits of alleged
radicalizers. See Greenwald et al., supra note 253.  As Jameel Jaffer, Deputy Director of the
ACLU, notes the problem is that “the NSA’s surveillance activities are anything but nar-
rowly focused—the agency is collecting massive amounts of sensitive information about
virtually everyone.” Id.  The list has been shared with fifteen agencies including “the
Departments of Justice and Commerce and the Drug Enforcement Administration.” Id.
For a list of distribution recipients, see Greenwald et al., supra note 253.
258 Amar, supra note 117, at 810.
259 See Chilling Effects: NSA Surveillance Drives U.S. Writers to Self-Censor, PEN AM. (Nov. 12,
2013), http://www.pen.org/sites/default/files/Chilling%20Effects_PEN%20American
.pdf.
260 Id. at 6.
261 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1653
(1999) (“The health of a democratic society depends both on the group-oriented process
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One way to think of the problem is as the need for anonymity.  Christo-
pher Slobogin has explained that perspective: “Anonymity in public pro-
motes freedom of action and an open society.  Lack of public anonymity
promotes conformity and an oppressive society.”262  He calls this problem
“public privacy.”263  That seeming oxymoron captures the need to be public,
yet private from government oversight.  It is anonymity to the government
that matters.  That anonymity may be based on protections from direct sur-
veillance or protections from the government accessing third party, private
sector records of recent and past communications and acts.  Julie Cohen has
shown why that is so.264  Surveillance changes behaviors, because “the experi-
ence of being watched will constrain, ex ante, the acceptable spectrum of
belief and behavior.”265  Instead of robust, diverse, and challenging ideas, we
will favor the “the bland and the mainstream.”266  We end up with a dimin-
ished “capacity to act and to decide,” which leads to “the highest possible
degree of compliance with [what the state determines is] the model . . . citi-
zen.”267  This problem is a type of chilling effect.268
Put differently, we live in an information state, but not what Jack Balkin
has called a “democratic information state.”269  That distinction makes all the
difference in protecting associational freedom.  A democratic information
state exercises data discipline.  Regardless of how information is gathered,
democratic information states must:
collect and collate only the information they need to ensure efficient gov-
ernment and national security.  They do not keep tabs on citizens without
justifiable reasons; they create a regular system of checks and procedures to
avoid abuse.  They stop collecting information when it is no longer needed
and they discard information at regular intervals to protect privacy.  When it
is impossible or impractical to destroy information—for example, because it
is stored redundantly in many different locations—democratic information
states strictly regulate its subsequent use.270
of democratic deliberation and the functioning of each person’s capacity for self-govern-
ance.”); cf. Inazu, supra note 51, at 576 (noting that the purposes of assembly are not
limited to the common good).
262 SLOBOGIN, supra note 212, at 92.
263 Id.
264 See generally Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (calling for strong data privacy protection).
265 Id. at 1426.
266 Id.
267 Simitis, supra note 252, at 733.
268 Accord United States v. Stewart, 686 F.3d 156, 171–73 (2d Cir. 2012); see Frederick
Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV.
685, 693 (1978) (“A chilling effect occurs when individuals seeking to engage in activity
protected by the first amendment are deterred from so doing by governmental regulation
not specifically directed at that protected activity.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Solove,
supra note 5, at 154–59 (discussing cases where courts have found information gathering
to have a chilling effect).
269 Balkin, supra note 13, at 17.
270 Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
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Balkin’s democratic information state maps to the limited information collec-
tion and return procedures required when following warrant procedures.
Limiting information collection to what is necessary and rejecting broad sys-
tems of “keeping tabs on citizens” connects to the reasonableness inquiry.
Calling for checks and procedures fits within the idea of judicial clearance
and ongoing justification for surveillance.  And, the claim that data must be
destroyed or subsequent use “strictly regulate[d]” makes perfect sense
because of the temptation problem.271  Even after the checks and balances
for the intake of data are in place, we need them for what may be done later.
But as we have seen, these practices are not in place for data.  Instead, we
leave data hoards unregulated.
Claims that government should have unfettered access to or maintain its
own data hoard make no sense, as soon as one appreciates how those claims
affect associational freedom.  The government has asserted, “[i]f you’re look-
ing for the needle in the haystack, you have to have the entire haystack to
look through.”272  One irony is that the cell phone data program sought, and
at one point may have had, one hundred percent of our call data; but the
government now claims it has been only able to obtain thirty percent, while
also wanting to return to having higher amounts of the call data.  The varying
claims about amounts of data and needs for data reveal the problem.  On the
one hand, if government is collecting all data possible that may make sense
for discerning patterns of threats as opposed to targeting specific people.273
But the new claim that we need not worry, because the program collected a
smaller amount, indicates that the claims for why the program was in place
are dubious or false.274
When the government claims it needs vast amounts of data to do its job
in seeking out terrorists, it is using the same, rejected logic argued in associa-
tion cases.  The discussion over how much data is collected can miss the key
point here.275  Whether one calls it protecting from incitement to riot or
271 Id.
272 See Ellen Nakashima, NSA Is Collecting Less than 30 Percent of U.S. Call Data, Officials
Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
nsa-is-collecting-less-than-30-percent-of-us-call-data-officials-say/2014/02/07/234a0e9e-
8fad-11e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da_story.html (quoting Deputy Attorney General James Cole)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
273 Whether data analysis and data mining may be used by law enforcement is an
important question but is beyond the scope of this Article.
274 Nakashima, supra note 272 (“[T]he revelation [of the smaller data set] ‘calls into
question whether the rationale offered for the program is consistent with the way the pro-
gram has been operating.’” (quoting Professor Edward Felten)).
275 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring) (expressing concern that GPS tracking “mak[es] available at a relatively low cost such
a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the Government,
in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track”); cf. Gray & Citron, supra note 231, at 101
(“[T]he threshold Fourth Amendment question raised by quantitative privacy concerns is
whether an investigative technique or technology has the capacity to facilitate broad pro-
grams of indiscriminate surveillance . . . .”). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the
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ensuring national security, there is a broad claim of need that in reality
enables suppression of association.  When associational interests are at stake,
criminal procedure must account for associational interests.  Criminal proce-
dure has done so for bugging, wiretaps, and GPS tracking in real time.  The
law must now fully recalibrate for the new era of backward-looking data-
driven surveillance.
III. DISCIPLINE AND DATA HOARDING
The procedural protections for information gathering are monuments
of a dead era.  We look at them, applaud them, and understand from where
they came.  They have some relevancy.  But like steam engines in a railroad
museum that can still run, they do not serve our needs well.  The way we
share and store data has shifted.  The new frontier must address different
problems.  The government can obtain sensitive data that would be restricted
and managed if obtained with forward-looking surveillance, simply by look-
ing backward.276  When it does so, warrant protections are gone, but the
threat to associational freedom is large.277  This Part sets out the procedures
to manage backward-looking surveillance.  Specifically, I argue that back-
ward-looking surveillance should be time limited just as we limit forward-
looking wiretaps and tracking.  In addition, we should re-embrace the return
requirement.  That requirement allows government to obtain material with a
warrant, but give the material back once the government investigation is
over.  Recapturing this limit would mitigate the government’s ability to keep
data hoards and dossiers that can be used to threaten our associational
freedom.
A. Against General Warrants for Data
The solution to the problems of data exhaust lies in the limits we have
for forward-looking surveillance.  The harms of unauthorized surveillance
reappear when the government is allowed to dig up our past associational
activity without limit.  Unfettered surveillance even in public places poses
harms by chilling freedom of association.  Warrant procedures are the safe-
guards to mitigate those harms.  They are not perfect, but they create the
possibility for a check and balance on executive actions.  The best answer for
the problems of data gathering is to institute warrant procedural protection
for such requests.  As we will see, each of the steps matter, but the time limits
and the necessity of return are especially important.
Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 314–15, 344 (2012) (arguing that exactly what
the threshold is for an amount of data to be a problem is too indeterminate to be useful).
276 See Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 166
(2008).
277 See id. at 139; cf. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir.
2013) (“[Authorization of] [o]rders for historical cell site information if an application
meets the lesser ‘specific and articulable facts’ standard, rather than the Fourth Amend-
ment probable cause standard, is not per se unconstitutional.”).
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Given the harms, a magistrate should review a warrant for phone
records, web sites, GPS coordinates or other data exhaust, and the warrant
must be specific regarding the crime, from whom the data is coming, and the
data to be seized.278  Those requirements are obvious but not in place.  The
current system thus allows the government to forgo establishing probable
cause and use a general warrant approach to surveillance.279
Time limited surveillance is a vital part of the balance between civil
rights and government needs.280  We all live under the possibility that
tomorrow law enforcement may consider us a suspect, establish probable
cause, and then conduct surveillance on us.  Once that happens, the govern-
ment may stumble upon our noncriminal associations, but when this occurs,
law enforcement is not supposed to continue the surveillance.281  In fact,
with a wiretap, listening must be “conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception.”282
Steps to comply with this mandate include using “spot checks”—listening for
short periods such as one or two minutes—to see whether criminal acts are
being discussed.283  When discussions are not germane to the criminal inves-
tigation, law enforcement must stop listening.284  Even one hour of uninter-
rupted listening can be long enough to suppress the evidence learned from
the wiretap, when there is no evidence of criminal acts being discussed.285
Unlike the bulk data programs of the NSA and FBI, the emphasis is on not
listening rather than gathering all conversations and sorting them later.
Even when following minimization procedures, the government cannot listen
in on or track us for more than thirty or forty-five days without continually
showing the need to do so.286  Thus suppose you joined the Communist
Party when it advocated the overthrow of the U.S. government, opposed the
IRS and taxes, joined an Islamic charity that turned out to be a front, advo-
cated for the ability to own and carry assault weapons, demonstrated against a
war, and so on.  You know that the government may begin watching you sub-
ject to some limits.  That is a risk.  But suppose also that after your activity,
you stopped.  You moved away from those areas.  After you stopped, you have
protection that the government will have less ability to watch you.  In con-
trast, the current system allows a broad vacuum approach to data that reveals
noncriminal activity that reaches deep into one’s past.  In fact, the NSA and
FBI have often used this loophole to maintain dossiers of noncriminal activity
precisely because they can use them to threaten people and associations not
in line with incumbent power.  The question “isn’t it true you were a member
278 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
279 Id.
280 Id. at 59–60 (explaining why time-limited surveillance is required).
281 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2012).
282 Id.
283 See, e.g., United States v. North, 735 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2013).
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(C).
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of the Communist Party?” becomes all the more powerful when you know any
association from your past may be found and used against you.  The threat of
persecution for noncriminal acts attacks associational freedom by undermin-
ing the way associations “form and grow.”287
Just as we don’t allow unending surveillance because it “is the equivalent
of a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing
of probable cause,”288 we must limit how far back law enforcement can dig.
But what would a termination date look like?  Forward-looking surveillance
requires a date by which it ends;289 yet currently law enforcement may ask for
as much data going as far back as a third party may keep records.  In the past,
those records may not have been kept for long because of cost.  Today, how-
ever, it is much less expensive to keep such records, and businesses often
keep such records as part of complying with government regulations and/or
part of using data to operate and understand their business.  Thus law
enforcement might be able to ask for a month, a year, two years, seven years
of data—in short, for as much data as possible.
I offer that a good way to limit this sort of grab is to mirror the time
limits for forward-looking surveillance.  Establishing the optimal time limit
for backward-looking surveillance is beyond the scope of this Article.  Indeed
each of the three branches of government has ways to address the issues this
Article raises.  As with earlier changes in surveillance power, courts have
started to establish some limits on surveillance that implicates associational
freedom.  The legislature could step in and offer a solution similar to the way
it did when passing the Wiretap Act.  Or the executive could issue an order to
limit the way data is used.  That said, I offer as a starting point one model.  A
thirty-day limit, as is the case for wiretapping, could be the baseline.290  If,
however, one believes location data is not content or to be protected as much
as what one might say on the phone, data exhaust would be closer to GPS
tracking data.  Even so, requests for data should be limited to forty-five days
just as GPS tracking is limited to forty-five days for forward-looking surveil-
lance.291  For example, assume there is a forty-five day time limit, and imag-
ine you are investigating a bank robbery.  To obtain the first chunk of data,
you’d follow warrant procedures, obtain and analyze the data, and see what
you could learn about your suspects.  If that request revealed enough data for
the prosecution, you’d stop.  If the data indicated more people were involved
and/or the robbery was part of a larger, complicated criminal endeavor,
you’d go back to the judge, make your case, and request authorization for
more data on the new people.  In addition, you could ask permission to go
back another forty-five days for the original suspects.  As with forward-looking
surveillance, there may be a long surveillance period—months or even years
of data if approved—and/or large surveillance net—covering many different
287 See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
288 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
289 Id.
290 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
291 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(C).
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conspirators.  The goal is that once the investigation has what it needs and
there is no evidence of new suspects, the backward-looking data requests
would have to stop.  By limiting how far back an investigation can search, this
approach protects associational concerns surveillance inherently threatens,
because it opens the door to freedom from future persecution.  Nonetheless,
the ability to access our records reveals another constitutional infirmity.
Current data gathering does not provide for the return of data once an
investigation is over, but return or destruction is precisely what the Constitu-
tion requires.292  A core but underappreciated principle of criminal proce-
dure is that the government must return items taken as part of an
investigation once they are not needed.293  A major problem for the Berger
Court was that the New York statute did not provide for a return on the
warrant, and thus law enforcement could use “seized conversations of inno-
cent as well as guilty parties”294 in perpetuity.  Similar to the minimization
procedures for wiretapping, return imposes a limit on the way the govern-
ment can have access to data not pertinent to an investigation.  As Harold
Krent has explained, information taken by law enforcement must be “consis-
tent with the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  Once
such purposes no longer exist, justification for continued possession of . . .
information ceases.”295  The need to delete data has been missed, perhaps
because it was not seen as the equivalent of papers or the less tenable con-
tent/non-content distinction.  But if a recorded conversation, which today
would be digital, has to be destroyed, data should be treated the same way.
The focus should be on the harm, which is the way the retained information
could include innocent people’s information and/or could be used in
perpetuity.  Return as deletion would limit the ability to hoard data for non-
investigative activity.  In addition, we must have notice about what data is
being collected from third parties absent “exigent circumstances.”296  With-
out that protection, we never know that the data has been collected.  Instead
there is a “blanket grant of permission to eavesdrop” that lacks “adequate
judicial supervision or protective procedures.”297
This approach does not turn on a property distinction. Katz explained
that the Constitution protects people, not places, but we still have extra pro-
tection for places such as the home.  I argue that the Constitution protects
292 Berger, 388 U.S. at 60; accord id. at 66 (Douglas, J., concurring).
293 Krent, supra note 14, at 50–51 (arguing for increased limits “on what law enforce-
ment officers can do with property and information after a legitimate search and seizure”
including subjecting data to the return requirement).  Krent’s focus was mainly on the way
law enforcement might further disclose information and relied on the idea of coerced
information gathering to determine reasonableness. Id. at 51, 76–77.  Those concerns
matter, but this Article asks about the harms from collection regardless of disclosure to a
general public and when there is not coercion.
294 Berger, 388 U.S. at 60.
295 Krent, supra note 14, at 69.
296 Berger, 388 U.S. at 59–60 (noting that the state statute at issue in Berger “permits
unconsented entry without any showing of exigent circumstances”).
297 Id. at 60.
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associational freedom and has extra protection for speech.  As Balkin
explained, a democratic information state must limit its data collection,
delete the data, or “strictly regulate its subsequent use.”298  Those ideals fit
within the way the Fourth Amendment protects associational freedom.
What we need is data separation—a way to keep government away from
the data hoards by which it is tempted to abuse associational freedom.  Lim-
ited collection at the outset of an investigation—i.e., avoiding bulk data
grabs—separates government from data not related to the investigation.  If
for some reason bulk data grabs were reasonable, deletion of the data after
the investigation is over would reestablish data separation.  That would elimi-
nate the government’s data hoard.  Government would have to go back to
private hoards for the same data.  Assuming we have procedures with judicial
oversight and limited data requests, we would have maintained data separa-
tion at both the intake and ongoing use level.  We will have started to disci-
pline data hoarding.  That said, there are limits to the associational freedom
analysis.
B. Associational Freedom in Perspective
Associational freedom cannot explain all aspects of limiting surveillance;
not all surveillance triggers the limits offered here.299  Pervasiveness is a key
factor in determining whether the surveillance in question implicates associa-
tional freedom and thus must be restricted.  Secrecy matters.  Cost plays a
role as well.  None of these factors is dispositive.  As I have argued through-
out this Article, the method must be to identify when surveillance chills asso-
ciational freedom.  Some examples help see how this may work.
Consider watching someone in public.  Following a car with one or a
team of police or watching people in public places are different practices
than the ones that raise associational alarms.  They are analog acts with high
costs.  They don’t sweep in all of a suspect’s noncriminal activities to date or
the activities of the rest of us.  As the Jones court pointed out, that changes if
all cars are required to have GPS or enough do that third parties now in
effect track us for the police.  Video camera or closed-circuit television sur-
veillance is another example of shifting threats to associational freedom.
Such systems have been allowed in part because they film public places.300
But whether a system itself is unconstitutional has not been addressed.301  A
large-scale camera system has obvious associational implications.  It would
298 Balkin, supra note 13, at 18.
299 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 5, at 152 (“Almost every search or seizure could be
understood to have some dimension that might involve a First Amendment activity because
all human interaction involves communication and association.  In the end, the First
Amendment could swallow up all of criminal procedure.” (footnote omitted)).
300 SLOBOGIN, supra note 212, at 155 (“[C]ourts that have considered application of the
Fourth Amendment to cameras aimed at public streets or other areas frequented by a large
number of people have declared that such surveillance is not a search, on the ground that
any expectation of privacy one might have in these areas is unreasonable.”).
301 Id.
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catch us as we went to offices, churches, temples, hotels, and bars.  It would
capture with whom we went to those places or who entered them for later
cross-referencing.  Yet current technology may not allow law enforcement to
search hundreds or thousands of hours to identify who was doing those activi-
ties.  The cost to store the video may still be expensive given the size of the
files.  But the cost to store data keeps dropping and facial recognition
software keeps improving.  The science fiction world of feeding a face into a
computer to see whether there is a match even in a vast sea of noisy data will
be a reality much faster than we might think.  As that happens, associational
freedom analysis would tilt towards requiring procedures and oversight to
limit law enforcement’s ability to access and use the data.
There are some other open questions here.  Government could create
its hoard based on proper, targeted investigation and surveillance.  As with
other areas of investigation, government would likely be allowed to keep that
data just as it keeps fingerprints, mug shots, and DNA from those under sus-
picion or if they are convicted felons.302  Even so, as technology makes the
ability to analyze such information easier and more powerful, government
might learn about much more than criminal matters.  Associational analysis
will be required, when the technology shifts the power of government to
learn from the data.  That analysis may still allow use of the data, because we
don’t afford felons the same rights as non-felons.303  But the key point is to
have the debate and explain how such use does not threaten associational
freedom.  The idea of data analysis brings us to another problem that this
Article has left for another time, but that should be noted.
Data hoards are not going away, and they can be useful.  The ideas set
forth here seek to limit the harms that data hoards can foster.  One idea
might be to delete hoards regularly, as some businesses do with their records.
Or we might limit the amount and how long data is stored by government or
even third parties.304  After all, we know that the government has gone into
private data either under the cloak of national security or as outright inva-
sion.  Yet, we may want to have the ability to search that data in a targeted
manner, precisely because we can tell who planned a robbery, kidnapped a
child, or planted a bomb.  Rather than trusting the government to do the
right thing, an escrow with proper oversight could be in place if we choose to
maintain data hoards for governmental use.305  This solution brings us back
to our problem and core point.  A data escrow is still a data hoard.  Data
302 See Krent, supra note 14, at 95–96.
303 Id. at 96–97.
304 Private sector data practices are a subject for another time, but one reason not to
dictate terms is that the private sector uses data to improve its business and learn. See
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 27 (2013).
305 A version of this idea has been offered in response to the NSA data-gathering pro-
gram.  President Obama has agreed with the Final Report of the Review Group on Intelli-
gence and Communications Technologies proposal that bulk metadata should be kept in
third party hands or some special third party storage entity. See Josh Keller et al., Obama’s
Changes to Government Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2014/01/17/us/nsa-changes-graphic.html?ref=technology. That proposal
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hoards always present a great temptation for abuse.  No matter what we
decide is the best way to manage access to data hoards, there will always be
the temptation—perhaps even in good faith as the executive tries to protect
us—to cut corners or use new methods that appear sound.  The key principle
must be to ask whether new techniques threaten associational freedom, and
if so, what we must do to protect that freedom.
The idea is perhaps radical but not all encompassing.  It is radical in the
true sense of the word.  Associational freedom is at the root of our democ-
racy.  Our Constitution protects acts that are not speech and are not private.
As such I have argued that associational freedom must be part of the reasona-
bleness inquiry.  The idea is limited because of practical factors.  The reason-
ableness inquiry often requires recalibration.  The concurrences in Jones
called out a current moment for recalibration: the potential for unending
forward and backward tracking.  They noted that assuming that anything we
share with third parties had no protection from law enforcement harmed
“associational freedom.”  I have sought to support that point by showing what
that freedom is, what actions can harm it, and the grounds for protecting it.
Once we understand associational freedom, not only can we better set limits
on current surveillance, but we have the tools to assess new surveillance tech-
nology as it emerges.
CONCLUSION
Associational freedom has many forms, is vital to our democracy, and
must be protected.  Yet, it has been forgotten as an independent interest.
Instead of recognizing, as the Founders did, that many activities that are not
speech and not private still deserve protection, we have moved to a world
where only speech and private acts are free from government oversight.
Thus many activities such as meeting, reading, sharing ideas, and traveling
have become fair game for government surveillance.  But surveillance chills
associational freedom.  Indeed, surveillance has been used time and again to
suppress associational freedom of precisely the groups—free thinking, dissi-
dent, challenging—the Constitution is supposed to protect.  In the past, sur-
veillance was expensive and difficult.  Today, it is cheap and easy.  In
addition, the sort of surveillance that threatened associational freedom often
required judicial oversight and limits.  But technology has created a loop-
hole.  The government can simply go to a third party and demand data.
There is little, to no, oversight, and the request can cover years of data about
where we went, with whom we spoke, and what we have read.  The govern-
ment can have unfettered access to a perfect picture of our activities and
associations regardless of whether they are criminal.  This Article has argued
this asymmetry of protection cannot be allowed to continue.  It has offered
that protecting associational freedom in all its forms—the right to petition,
relates to national security and NSA practices. Id.  Nonetheless, the insight should apply
for domestic surveillance as well.
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to assemble, to share ideas, to critique, to celebrate, to read, to coordinate
activity, to march, and more—is a core part of our democracy and is pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment.
